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Content-Neutral Public Forum
Regulations: The Rise of the
Aesthetic State Interest, the
Fall of Judicial Scrutiny
By HAROLD L. QUADRES*
Constitutional questions relating to the ability of a governmental
body to regulate free expression have always been complex, the issues
difficult to understand, the rules difficult to apply. Yet, prior to the last
decade, there did seem to be two clear parameters. First, certain expres-
sion lacked sufficient social value to garner full first amendment protec-
tion.I The state's right to regulate or suppress such speech was virtually
unlimited. 2 Conversely, when the speech did not fall within one of the
classes of unprotected speech, the first amendment placed substantial
limits on the state's restrictive powers. The limits on state regula-
tions aimed at the content of the particular speech were exceptionally
stringent.3
Whether given expression merited constitutional protection was
* Professor of Law, Whittier College School of Law. B.A., 1965, Dartmouth College;
J.D., 1968, Harvard Law School.
The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable research assistance of Guy W. Mur-
ray, Class of 1986, Whittier College School of Law.
1. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity not constitutionally pro-
tected); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libelous utterances not constitution-
ally protected); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (insulting or
fighting words not protected).
2. This has been refered to in commentary as a "two- level" theory of speech protection.
See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 2 PuB. Er. ADVERT. & ALLIED
FIELDS L.Q. 439 (1963). Unprotected expression could be regulated or suppressed by the state
so long as the state's action was sufficiently rational to satisfy minimal substantive due process
limitations. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 501 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (Court should defer to state's
judgment so long as not irrational).
3. Any regulation of protected speech, even though neutrally applied, had to be more
than merely rational. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). Any restriction based
upon the content of the speech itself must overcome even higher hurdles. See Linmark Assoc.,
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (only emergency justifies repression);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (speech susceptible to
restriction only to prevent immediate danger to state interests).
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often a difficult question, but this definitional analysis presumed that a
court need not involve itself in the mire of judicial balancing that is so
often criticized as legislative second-guessing. 4 Perhaps because the re-
sult of an actual case was often preordained by the first amendment clas-
sification attached to the speech involved, the United States Supreme
Court has had great difficulty both in defining the contours of those clas-
sifications 5 and in applying these contours to particular facts, even when
the definitional boundaries were considered relatively precise. 6 Still, once
one overcame the definitional hurdle, the guidelines of permissible state
regulation were reasonably clear.
Second, one had a right to disperse his message, no matter how
heavily protected, at a given location only if that site was considered to
be a public forum. The right to exercise free speech on privately owned
property was generally not within the protective ambit of the first amend-
ment, and attempted speech on private property could subject the
speaker to liability for trespass.7 Even publicly owned property was not
necessarily a proper forum for speech if the government had not opened
up that property as a public forum,8 or if free speech activities would
have interfered with the primary use of that public property.9 Again,
4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 784-90 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting).
5. Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) ("Obscene material is mate-
rial which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.") with Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15, 23-34 (1973) (three-part test for obscenity that incorporates the Roth
definition); compare Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1952) (It is certainly
libelous to charge another falsely "with being a rapist, robber, carrier of knives and guns, and
user of marijuana.") with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (de-
famatory falsehood regarding official conduct of a public official not actionable absent a show-
ing of "actual malice" by the publisher); compare Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) (The first amendment does not protect speech that, under the circumstances, is of "such
nature as to create a clear and present danger that [it] will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent.") with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (A
state may not "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.").
6. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (admitting that,
although he could not intelligibly define obscenity, he nevertheless knew it when he saw it).
7. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
8. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 834-38 (1976) (military bases not a public forum);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 301-04 (1974) (city-owned buses not a public
forum); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-49 (1983)
(school mail boxes not a limited public forum). But cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (Municipal theatres are public forums.).
9. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 834-38 (1976) (military base's business to train soldiers,
not provide public forum); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966) (jails built for security
purposes, not demonstrations); see Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup.
Cr. REV. 233, 251-52.
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there were difficulties in determining whether a particular site for expres-
sive activities was, in fact, a public forum.10 Once a court found the site
to be a public forum, however, the state's ability to constitutionally re-
strict protected speech within that forum was narrowly circumscribed.II
Yet, whether the Court was defining protected speech or determin-
ing whether a given location was a public forum, two legal questions
have seemed settled for the last half-century, if not since the adoption of
the Bill of Rights. First, although until recently all speech that qualified
for first amendment protection was considered fully or equally pro-
tected, 12 political speech was particularly worthy of constitutional pro-
tection because it was at the very heart of free speech guarantees.
13
Second, with respect to the exercise of free expression on public streets,
as the Court recognized in Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization: 14
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemori-
ally been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets
and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
10. Compare Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 319-20
(1968) (private shopping center as a freely accessible and open public forum) and Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502, 505 (1946) (sidewalks of private corporate town as a public fo-
rum) with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 512, 521 (1976) (no first amendment rights for
picketers to enter shopping center to advertise their strike). But cf Prune Yard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-88 (1980) (state constitutional provisions allowing individu-
als to exercise free speech and petition rights on privately owned shopping center upheld).
11. Regulations based upon speech content, if allowed at all, had to be necessary to serve
a compelling state interest. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980); see Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (Time, place, and manner regulations must be
applicable to all speech irrespective of content.). If such regulations are content-neutral, they
nonetheless must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave open
alternative channels of communication. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980); cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("[O]ne is not to have
the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may
be exercised in some other place.").
12. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231-32 (1977) (political nature of
speech not a constitutional criteria); see also United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945) ("[R]ights of free
speech and a free press are not confined to any field of human interest.").
13. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 404 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 787
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (A
major purpose of the first amendment is to protect free discussion of governmental affairs.);
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971). See
generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION To SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948).
14. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality opinion).
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immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.1 5
Thus, if there were any factual circumstance in which the Court
would seem to require the utmost justification before allowing restric-
tions on free expression, it would involve truly political speech in the
public streets or parks. Specifically referring to a situation in which a
state might attempt to regulate the use of political posters in one of these
traditional forums, one commentator has asserted that
an absolute ban on the use of such devices would be constitutionally
impermissible. Indeed, an absolute ban on all public issue billboards
or signs for aesthetic or traffic safety reasons would be no more justifi-
able than an absolute ban on leafleting to prevent littering .... Thus,
although the state, taking location into account, may narrowly regu-
late the size, structure, appearance, and perhaps the quantity of such
devices, it may not prohibit them altogether.
16
Nonetheless, in the case of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,'1
the Supreme Court did allow a city to ban the use of political campaign
posters on its public streets. The aim of this Article is to analyze the
reasons for the result in Vincent. This Article will show that the Court's
recent attempts to give historically unprotected speech some, but not all,
of the first amendment's profferred protection,18 while laudable in the
short run, ultimately may have led to lesser protection for first amend-
15. Id. at 515. Even Hague did not assert that access to such forums for speech purposes
was absolute:
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for commu-
nication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not
absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in
the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
Id. at 515-16.
16. Stone, supra note 9, at 258.
17. 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
18. Such partially protected speech would include both offensive and commercial speech.
For examples of commercial speech, see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (expression related solely to the economic interests of
speaker and audience); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976) (speech for which money is spent to project an image, speech
that is carried in a form and "sold" for profit, speech that does no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction). For examples of the Court's treatment of offensive language, compare
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739-41 (1978) (words referring to excretory or sexual
activities or organs, deliberately repeated in a broadcast that children probably would hear,
held to be patently offensive and the broadcast indecent) with Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105,
107-09 (1973) (statement "we'll take the fucking street later" not within the "limited classes"
of speech that states may constitutionally punish, such as fighting words, obscene speech, or
speech having a tendency to lead to violence) and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19-21
(1971) (wearing jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft," where women and children present,
not obscene because not significantly erotic; not "fighting words" because not "directed to the
person of the hearer," and therefore not punishable).
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ment speech as a whole. Specifically, the Article demonstrates that the
Court, having initially sanctioned certain state interests as sufficient to
justify time, place, and manner restrictions on semiprotected speech only,
now has begun to accept these same state interests as sound reasons for
limiting all expression. The Article then attempts to show that the
Court, while ostensibly using a multifaceted balancing approach toward
such regulations, in fact is doing little balancing. Rather than weighing
the factors on each side of the scale against each other, the Court is judg-
ing each factor in isolation, assessing only how each element indepen-
dently is affected by the facts at issue. The Court, in effect, is using a
checklist approach rather than a balancing one. Finally, the Article sug-
gests some possible resolutions to the problem of public forum regula-
tions that would better accommodate both the state's interests in
maintaining order and tranquility and the values inherent in granting
free speech its fullest play.
Semiprotected Speech: A Brief Background
In Cohen v. California,19 the Supreme Court seemed to elevate offen-
sive,20 but clearly non-obscene,21 speech to constitutionally protected
status.22 The Court soon appreciated, however, that this offensive
speech, if allowed to circulate as freely as previously recognized pro-
tected expression, would imperil certain viable state interests.23 Faced
with this dilemma, the Court questioned,24 but never totally repudi-
19. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen, defendant wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the
Draft" into a courthouse. He was convicted of violating a statute that prohibited "maliciously
and wilffilly disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person... by ... offen-
sive conduct." Id. at 16. The Court, finding that the expression was neither obscene nor an
example of fighting words, held that, absent a more compelling reason for its actions, the state
could not absolutely prohibit the public display of such offensive expression. Prior to Cohen,
offensive speech was held to have no serious social value. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
20. Offensive speech has come to be defined as speech that is not obscene because it is not
significantly erotic, and not "fighting words" because it is not "directed to the person of the
hearer." Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19-21.
21. Such speech may either not appeal to an individual's prurient interests or possess
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973).
22. See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
23. The mere open display of offensive material could lead to lower property values and
increases in the transient population and crime in the surrounding area. Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1976). Its dissemination over the broadcast media may
offend those adults who have retreated to the privacy of their homes and may harm children
whose parents disapprove of their children listening to such material. FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
24. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746-48 (1976) (plurality opinion) (such
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ated,25 the new constitutional status of offensive speech. Instead, the
Court sanctioned the use of state power to restrict offensive expression in
ways that would not have been lawful if applied to other first amendment
speech.
26
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,27 for example, the Court clearly rec-
ognized the government's right to protect the general public from being
assaulted aurally by the content or form of indecent speech, at least
within the privacy of their own homes. Nevertheless, the Court limited
the scope of its opinion by emphasizing that the degree of state control
may depend on the type of speech and the forum involved. The Court
noted that, in regulating a situs that is less than a full public forum, the
state might more easily impose time or manner restrictions.
28
speech deserves little, if any, constitutional protection); Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68-71 (1976) (plurality opinion) (interest in protecting offensive expression is
of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate).
25. In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), the Court implicitly
seemed to reelevate offensive expression to a more fully protected first amendment position.
Cf Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(Explicitly adult material may deserve less than full constitutional protection.). Schad, per-
haps not coincidentally, was the one case in which the Court found the city's environmental
regulations invalid. See infra notes 98-105 & accompanying text.
26. Young was one of the earliest cases to allow a content-based time, place, and manner
regulation and also may have been the first case to allow any regulation of speech to be justified
by a desire to protect private property interests. Cf Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (Government has no right to restrict expression because of its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content and may not make exclusions from a public forum on the basis of
content alone.); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (prevention of litter insufficient
interest to justify restrictions on the public forum). In contrast, Pacifica was the first case to
recognize the state's interests in protecting children from receiving expression that was not
obscene, at least as to children. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-51 (1978);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634-43 (1968) (standards of obscenity with respect to
children).
27. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, a New York radio station was censured for broad-
casting a monologue by George Carlin, which consisted of a comedy routine centering on the
frequent and explicit use of seven scatalogical words. While admitting that the monologue was
not obscene, the Court held that regulations channeling or even prohibiting the broad use of
such indecent language were justified by the government's interest in protecting both children
and the unwary adult listener in his home from such an expected aural assault. See also Ko-
vacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-89 (1949) (Privacy of the home is a sufficient interest to justify
content-neutral prohibitions on the use of sound trucks.).
28. The Court has always treated the broadcast media as a unique forum, neither falling
within the category of a truly public forum nor that of a private forum. The reasons for this
include the broadcast media's pervasive ability to intrude on the privacy of the home and the
fact that it traditionally has been considered a limited spectrum forum, thus giving the govern-
ment sole power to determine how those limited forums should be allotted so as best to pro-
mote the public interest. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-51 (different first amendment
limitations for broadcast media); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1973) (broadcast media present an unusual order of first amend-
[Vol. 37
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Similarly, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer
Council, Inc.29 signaled the Court's acceptance of purely commercial
speech as protected first amendment expression. In commercial speech
cases, the Court was more tentative, and ultimately more consistent, in
its approach. 30 The Court initially made it clear that commercial speech
does not require the same treatment as other constitutionally protected
expression. For example, the fact that one can determine objectively
whether the content of commercial speech is false or misleading31 vali-
dates the suppression of commercial speech on a basis that is not viable
when dealing with political or social speech.
This newly acquired, limited protection of commercial and offensive
expression has had a twofold effect on speech regulation in general.
First, when evaluating restrictions on such speech, the Court eagerly has
accepted not only the legitimacy, but the substantiality, of a state's inter-
est in protecting property values, 32 or the quality of the community living
environment, 33 or pure visual aesthetics34 as valid justifications for re-
stricting this speech. Second, the Court, while asserting that it evaluates
the means by which the state seeks to enhance or to promote these inter-
ment values); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969) (differences in
characteristics of the broadcast media justify different first amendment standards).
29. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The state of Virginia attempted to absolutely prohibit pharma-
cists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs. The Court overturned the law on the
ground that consumers have the right to receive such commercial expression to enable them to
make informed decisions in the economic marketplace.
30. The Court's initial recognition that offensive language qualified as protected speech
appeared to grant such expression full first amendment protection. See Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971). In later cases, however, the Court retreated from that apparent endorse-
ment, allowing offensive language to be regulated in ways that fully protected speech could not
be. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (indecent expression may be channeled, or even prohibited, on
electronic media); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (indecent ex-
pression may be subject to time, place, and manner restrictions on the basis of content). The
Court's initial recognition that commercial speech might deserve first amendment protection
concerned a situation in which such speech was intermingled with fully protected expression.
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Later, Virginia Pharmacy gave a fuller, yet still
qualified, endorsement to the first amendment value of commercial expression, a position from
which the Court has not had to retreat. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.
31. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979) (restrictions on false, deceptive, and
misleading commercial speech permissible); Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 775-81 (Stewart,
J., concurring); cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (False statements of
fact have no constitutional value.).
32. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 54 & n.6 (1976).
33. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973) (recognized state's interest
in "the quality of life and the total community environment" as valid basis for refusing to
grant obscene expresssion any first amendment protection).
34. Metromedia, Inc., v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981) (plurality
opinion).
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ests with heightened scrutiny,35 actually has approached such regulations
with little scrutiny.
36
Had the Court wholly maintained the initially clear distinction be-
tween offensive and commercial speech and other fully protected
speech,37 these new approaches would have provided moderate advances
in the protection of first amendment interests. Moreover, had the
Court's recognition of the social value of an increasingly wide variety of
speech content been its only contribution to the development of first
amendment law, the legacy of the present Court, generally viewed as
conservative in its overall treatment of individual rights issues,38 might
have been judged as exceptionally progressive.
Ultimately, however, the Court's recent interpretations may have
detracted from first amendment interests to a greater extent than they
may have enhanced them, for it seems to have transferred the analyses
regulating the dissemination of newly recognized and tentatively pro-
tected expression to cases involving restraints on speech traditionally ac-
corded the strongest historical protection. 39 It is certainly defensible for
the Court to recognize new problems posed by the unlimited dissemina-
tion of offensive or commercial messages. It also is defensible for the
Court to recognize newly threatened state interests and to adopt innova-
35. Regulations on commercial speech ostensibly must not only directly advance a sub-
stantial state interest, but must reach no further than necessary to accomplish the given objec-
tive. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980).
The Court's standards might be compared with its approach when using heightened, but not
strict, scrutiny in equal protection cases. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (statutory
classifications based on illegitimacy subject to heightened, but not strict, scrutiny).
36. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509-12 (1981) (plurality
opinion), for example, the Court justified the regulation as not "manifestly unreasonable,"
based upon what the city "may have believed" and "could reasonably conclude." This lan-
guage sounds suspiciously like that used in the Court's minimal scrutiny approach in equal
protection cases. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-90 (1955).
37. The Court has asserted that it has afforded commercial speech only a limited measure
of constitutional protection, allowing modes of regulation that the first amendment would not
tolerate with respect to ideological communication. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
453 U.S. 490, 506-07 (1981) (plurality opinion); see also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 8-10
(1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
38. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (sanc-
tioning discriminatory treatment of the mentally retarded); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct.
3405 (1984) (eliminating exclusionary remedy for certain actions previously considered to vio-
late fourth amendment rights); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (conceding increased
state power to discriminate against aliens).
39. Compare Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opin-
ion) (commercial speech may be banned from public forum to promote visual aesthetics) and
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (offensive expression may be regu-
lated to protect property values) with City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118
(1984) (political speech may be regulated in public forum to promote visual aesthetics).
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tive methods by which to preserve those interests. It is far less defensible,
however, for the Court to use this new methodology, wholly or in part, to
justify the suppression of fully protected speech without a well-reasoned
analysis of such application or a fair balancing of the significantly differ-
ent interests that may be involved.
In fact, prior to the Vincent 4° case, the Court disclaimed any inten-
tion of permitting a wholesale transfer of the new methodology used in
cases involving commercial or offensive speech to situations involving
political speech4' disseminated in that most "quintessential" of public
forums, the city streets.42 Yet, in Vincent the Court permitted exactly
that. The Court apparently equalized the degree of protection given to
all speech, not by elevating commercial or offensive speech to full first
amendment status, but by lessening the degree of protection accorded to
political expression. 43 In light of these drastic changes in first amend-
ment doctrine, it is necessary to analyze the reasons for this development
and to determine whether the Court acted fairly, consistently, and per-
ceptively in allowing that development. The starting point for this analy-
sis is the Vincent case itself.
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent:44 A Case Study
The decision in Vincent provides an excellent example of the present
Supreme Court's application of permissible time, place, and manner reg-
ulations in one of the most protected of public forums, the city streets.
Vincent was a relatively unknown candidate for a seat on the Los Ange-
les City Council. A group of Vincent's supporters hired a political sign
service company to create and to post signs advertising his candidacy.
The sign company displayed Vincent's signs by draping them over the
cross supports of public utility poles. Acting under a municipal ordi-
nance,45 the city maintenance department removed Vincent's signs,
46
40. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
41. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69 (1976) (plurality opinion).
42. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983);
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion).
43. This, in fact, was the danger that the Court warned against. "'To require a parity of
constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilu-
tion, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to
the latter kind of speech.'" Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 506 (1981)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
44. 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
45. The Los Angles Municipal Code provides:
No person shall paint, mark or write on, or post or otherwise affix, any hand-bill or
sign to or upon any sidewalk, crosswalk, curb, curbstone, street lamp post, hydrant,
tree, shrub, tree stake or guard, railroad trestle, electric light or power or telephone
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along with any other illegally hung posters that it found.47 The mainte-
nance department removed signs from all sections of the city, including
commercial and industrial areas.
Vincent's supporters and the sign company sought an injunction
against future removal of the posters.48 In response to the city's argu-
ment that its prohibition of temporary signs anywhere within the city
environs served its interests in promoting traffic safety and in alleviating
visual clutter,49 Vincent argued that, while his signs might contribute to
visual clutter, they did not interfere with traffic safety.50 Thus, his choice
of locations only implicated the aesthetic interest. Accepting this posi-
tion, the Court applied the current three-part standard for assessing the
validity of time, place, and manner restrictions on public forums. 51 To
or telegraph or trolley wire pole, or wire appurtenance thereof or upon any fixture of
the fire alarm or police telegraph system or upon any lighting system, public bridge,
drinking fountain, life buoy, life preserver, life boat or other life saving equipment,
street sign or traffic sign.
Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE art. VIII, ch. 2, § 28.04(a) (1983)
46. Section 28.04(c) of the Los Angleles Municipal Code provides:
Any hand-bill or sign found posted, or otherwise affixed upon any public property
contrary to the provisions of this section may be removed by the Police Department
or the Department of Public Works. The person responsible for any such illegal
posting shall be liable for the cost incurred in the removal thereof and the Depart-
ment of Public Works is authorized to effect the collection of said cost.
Id. § 28.04(c).
47. During the week of March 9, 1979, a majority of the signs removed contained purely
commercial messages. See Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2122 n.3.
48. Both parties sought a summary judgment in the federal district court, and the city
was granted summary judgment. The appellate court reversed. See Taxpayers for Vincent v.
Members of City Council, 682 F.2d 847, 848 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
Recognizing the fullest importance of political speech and the unique ecomony and efficiency
of political posters, id. at 850, the Ninth Circuit held that, because such posters in no way
interfered with the city's use of its light poles, the latter should be treated as a public forum.
Id. at 850-51. While conceding that a city's interest in reducing visual clutter is a substantial
one, the court stated that Los Angeles had not shown that it was "seriously and comprehen-
sively addressing aesthetic concerns with respect to its environment." Id. at 852. Finally, the
court held that the city's absolute ban on the posters was not the least restrictive means of
promoting its asserted interest. The court suggested that the city might regulate the size or
construction of posters, or institute clean up or removal requirements instead. Id. at 852-53.
49. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2123 n.6.
50. Id. at 2127.
51. Id. at 2130-33. The Court also cited the O'Brien test, which originated in the draft
card burning case, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien test was formu-
lated to define governmental power to restrict "symbolic" speech, regardless of the forum
involved. The O'Brien Court states that
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater than essen-
tial to the furtherance of that interest.
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pass constitutional muster under the time, place, and manner test, the
law in question, first, must be content-neutral, second, must be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and third, must leave
open ample alternative channels of communication.5 2 Ostensibly balanc-
ing these elements in light of the city's claim that Vincent's signs cau-
sed visual clutter of the public streets, the Court upheld the municipal
ordinance.
The Court had little trouble with the first element, that the regula-
tion must be content-neutral, because evidence showed that the city rou-
tinely removed signs regardless of their content.5 3 Furthermore, there
was no evidence that the removal was motivated by impropriety. The
Court did not analyze whether sign removal might have a heavier ad-
verse effect on some advertisers, political or otherwise, than on others.
5 4
Id. at 377.
In many ways, the O'Brien test duplicates the public forum time, place, and manner test.
See infra text accompanying note 52. Restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech
are generally within the police power of the state. As a result, the issue of the constitutional
power of the government to regulate speech would probably only arise in the case of federal
legislation. Both the O'Brien test and the time, place, and manner test require the government
to demonstrate that its regulation serves an important governmental interest. Similarly,
O'Brien requires that the regulation be content-neutral, rather than being triggered by the
subject matter of the speaker's message or his point of view. Finally, the Court in Vincent
itself seems to equate the O'Brien requirement that the restriction be no greater than essential
with the "narrowly tailored" element of the time, place, and manner test. Vincent, 104 S. Ct.
at 2130-32. As a whole, however, the time, place, and manner test is more speech-protective
than the O'Brien test because it also requires that the speaker have alternative access for dis-
seminating his speech. Cf Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065
(1984), which involved true symbolic speech in a traditional public forum. There, the Court,
while seeming to imply that these tests were identical, cited and applied both of the tests before
deciding that the governmental regulation was a valid one. Id. at 3071 n.8, 3076 n.6.
52. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980).
53. Content-neutrality is not a part of the balance itself, but rather is the threshhold that
a state's purposes and means must meet in order to invoke the time, place, and manner test. If
the ordinance had been found to be content-oriented, the city would have had to demonstrate
that its regulation was necessary to serve a compelling state interest and was narrowly drawn
to achieve that end. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980).
54. It is assumed for the purposes of this Article that the regulation in question was
indeed content-neutral, and, therefore, apparently point-of-view-neutral as well. Since all tem-
porary posters, regardless of their content, must be removed, it is difficult to argue that the
state is attempting to favor one side of any particular issue.
The Court, however, seems concerned only about regulations that favor a particular point
of view in an intentional and hostile fashion. A regulation such as that in Vincent, which
seems to put the less well-financed political candidate at a greater disadvantage, may ulti-
mately, even if incidentally, appear to favor particular points of view. This may not reflect
official distaste for those views, yet it might be grounds for the Court to judge such regulations
with a degree of skepticism to be sure that the government is not seeking to regulate content.
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With respect to the second element, the Court rejected the appellate
court's holding that eliminating visual blight was not, in this instance, a
sufficiently strong interest to justify an abridgment of free speech.
55
Rather, the Court routinely reaffirmed the reasoning of Metromedia, Inc.
v. San Diego56 that promotion of visual aesthetics constituted a substan-
tial state interest.57 The Court failed to discuss its earlier warning in
Metromedia that the first amendment protection traditionally given to
political speech, such as that involved in Vincent, was greater than that
given to commercial speech.
58
Moreover, the Court in Vincent narrowly defined the harm to the
city's interests to include only the visual clutter caused by the placement
of temporary signs on public property. 59 As a result, the Court found
that the means adopted to eliminate that very limited danger were not
only narrowly tailored, but absolutely precise. The Court distinguished
those cases upholding the right of a political speaker to pass out handbills
on the public streets over claims that handbill litter led to aesthetic harm
on two bases. 60 First, the Court maintained that the handbill cases were
designed to protect the rights of individual citizens to communicate di-
rectly with potential recipients of their message, without recognizing that
the leafieteers might be mere hired hands.61 Second, the Court con-
cluded that in Vincent the very mode of communication caused aesthetic
harm, while in the handbill cases, the secondary effect 62 of littering by
See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 525-29 (1981) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). The plaintiffs in Vincent also argued an equal protection violation on the ground that
the law discriminated against nonproperty owners. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2136 n.34. One
could argue that because a fundamental right, free speech, was involved, the Court should
have given the case a heightened degree of scrutiny.
Finally, one could argue that, because a fundamental right, at least to some degree, was
regulated in a manner that did have a discriminatory effect on different groups, the intent of
the rule makers should not have been relevant at all. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 103-
05 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Taxpayers for Vincent v. Members of City Council, 682 F.2d 847, 85 1-52 (9th Cir.
1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
56. 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion).
57. The Court made no reference to its earlier position that the prevention of litter on the
public streets did not meet the standard of substantiality required to justify limiting expression
in a public forum. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162-63 (1939).
58. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 514-15. Oddly enough, the Los Angeles system of ordi-
nances relating to the dispersal of handbills on its public streets does recognize the differences
in degree of protection given the two types of speech. The city prohibits the handing out of
commercial leaflets, a restriction it could not constitutionally apply to political leaflets. Los
ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE art. VIII, ch. 2, § 28.01.1 (1983).
59. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2130-32.
60. Id. at 2131-32.
61. Id. at 2131; see also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1930).
62. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2130-32. For a consideration of the meaning of secondary
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third parties, not the primary act of passing out the leaflets themselves,
caused the harm.
63
Finally, with respect to the third element of adequate alternative
channels of communication the Court held that Vincent's free speech
rights were not infringed improperly because he had adequate alternative
means by which he could still disperse his message-such as using hand-
bills or having individuals carry his posters. The Court, however,
seemed to view such alternatives in an abstract, rather than in a practi-
cal, sense.64
harms, see Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 70-72 nn.8-10 (1981); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71-72 nn.34-35 (1976) (plurality opinion).
63. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2130-32. This finding does serve as a distinction between the
two cases. If the Court were to revive the least intrusive alternative analysis it seemed to apply
in Schneider, it might nonetheless, on this particular issue, affirm the city's position that there
is no practicable alternative that will serve to alleviate the primary harm caused by Vincent's
posters.
64. Id. at 2132-33. The Court made no effort to determine whether the alternative meth-
ods of message dissemination would involve increased effort, time, or cost to the respondent,
nor whether such alternatives, even if adopted, would be as effective or influential as respon-
dent's use of the posters in question. The Court also held that Vincent had no right to attach
his posters to the cross-arms of public utility poles because, even though the streets may be
public forums, utility poles are not. Id. at 2133-34. This Article does not attempt to resolve
this issue, as the Court itself seemed to treat the position as a makeweight argument. How-
ever, such a judicial position presents two difficult problems.
The first, and most practical problem, is that Vincent must be read to hold that the post-
ing of notices is not a time-honored manner of communication in a public forum, or, if it once
was, it is no longer. Vincent seemed to have chosen the least intrusive or damaging method of
posting. He did not deface the streets, the sidewalks, the public buildings, or the occasional
trees remaining on Los Angeles' streets. Moreover, if the city's aesthetic interests prevent his
posting along commercial or industrial streets, it can clearly prevent him from doing so in a
park to preserve its relatively pristine nature. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 533-34 (Brennan,
J., concurring). Vincent would be allowed to have a supporter carry his signs around and
about the particular poles in question, but he may not post them.
Second, in deciding whether publicly owned property can be considered a public forum,
Vincent increases the confusion concerning whether the Court is using a "dedicated forum"
approach, see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion), an "interference" approach,
see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (plurality opinion), or is really freezing the definition and ex-
tent of public forums at their historical or traditional limits. For example, the Court asserted
that utility poles could not be shown to be an historically recognized public forum, an ap-
proach that would limit the concept of traditional forums to streets and parks as they existed a
century ago. The Court also found that, regardless of whether Vincent's posters interfered
with the primary use of the utility poles, the city had not dedicated use of the poles as a public
forum situs. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2133-34.
Finally, the Court's approach to the utility pole issue evidences a narrow attitude with
respect to the obvious reality that the nature of the streets and parks will change over the
years. Attempting to restrict the dicta in Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496
(1939) (plurality opinion) to streets as they existed in the 1930's misconceives, and ultimately
negates, the intent of the assertion itself. The intent of Hague was to protect judicially the
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The Court's application of its public forum test in Vincent causes
several general concerns, even if one accepts the current time, place, and
manner standards as sufficiently protective of speech in most cases.
First, the Court adopted a relatively low level of scrutiny while asserting
to the contrary. 65 The purported standard would require the state to
demonstrate that its ordinance narrowly served a substantial interest.
Yet the Court offered neither a clear explanation of how visual aesthetics
might be defined, nor any convincing factual or legal support for its posi-
tion that such aesthetics are indeed a substantial interest. The Court
then accepted the state's regulatory means as protecting that yet unde-
fined interest with no thoughtful consideration of whether those means
unduly affected free speech interests.
The Court's lack of candor creates a dilemma. The Court could
admit that, at least in the case of a content-neutral regulation, it in fact is
viewing state regulations in a favorable light 66 and could adopt standards
that make this clear. If the Court did so, however, it would be forced to
admit either a certain devaluation of speech itself, which is affected ad-
versely by restrictions regardless of their neutrality, or a devaluation of
the protection previously given to preferred public forums.
67
Alternatively, the Court could use a heightened degree of scrutiny.
sanctity of certain guaranteed forums to which the common man could always resort. Those
forums will continually be subject to technological change, but the need of the ordinary citizen
for an available and inexpensive forum in which to exercise his freedom to expression will not.
To assert that publicly owned utility poles or bus stops are not public forums not only melds
the definition of a traditional forum to concepts a century old, but also deprives such forums of
much of their value. There are not trees left upon which the public dissenter can tack his
notices. Yet, if the forum classification issue, relating to the nature of those poles, had been the
heart of the Vincent opinion, it would have been far less damaging to first amendment values
than the Court's wholehearted acceptance of visual aesthetics as a ground for closing down
traditional public forums.
65. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2133-34.
66. The Court still seems to be asserting that this is not the case, that even a content-
neutral public forum regulation must be more than merely rational. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
67. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
It is worth noting that, aside from historical precedent, the Los Angeles ordinances placed far
more restrictions on the public forum than on the immediately adjacent private forums. Thus,
irrespective of the degree of first amendment protection given to the speech involved, private
property owners are still allowed to post temporary or permanent signs or billboards so long as
they meet certain size, location, and safety standards. See Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL
CODE art. VII, ch. 6, § 67.01-.29 (1980) (definitions of different types of signs and advertising
statuaries and requirements for their erection); id. art. II, ch. 1, § 12.21 (7) (1981) (dealing
with zoning requirements for advertising matter of any kind in A and R zones); id. art. I, ch. 9,
§ 91.5201-.5213 (1982) (dealing with definitions and building regulations for construction, al-
teration, or repair of different types of signs); id. art. VIII, ch. 2, § 28.00-.20 (1983) (dealing
with licensing and permit requirements for different types of advertising).
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The Court, however, may have realized that such an approach could
cause intractable analytical problems.6 8 In many areas of the law, the
Court has had significant difficulty in distinguishing substantial interests
from legitimate interests.69 The Court has had similar trouble in deter-
mining less restrictive alternatives and in distinguishing a narrowly
tailored regulation from a rationally based one.70 Morever, a truly
searching degree of scrutiny probably would invalidate most forum regu-
lations aimed at promoting purely visual aesthetics, a result the Court
may wish to avoid.
Additionally, the Court did not forthrightly balance the relevant ele-
ments in judging public forum regulations. Rather than weighing the
interests involved in Vincent against one another, the Court isolated each
element, decided whether that element posed an issue in the case, and
dealt with that issue independently of the others.71 The Court did not
explicitly weigh the city's interest in a better-quality environment against
the degree of speech infringement. Arguably, the degree of environmen-
tal clutter caused by Vincent and others like him was quite small com-
pared to the amount of commercial expression that appears on private
property adjoining many of the city's public streets. The Court should
have emphasized the relative nature of the harm Vincent caused and ac-
tually weighed this harm against the burden the ordinance placed upon
Vincent in his special circumstances-an underfinanced minority polit-
ical candidate seeking to announce his candidacy in the most economi-
cally efficient way possible.
Finally, even if one accepts the technique of treating each element in
isolation, it is questionable whether the Court seriously and thoughtfully
considered each element of the standard. It failed to address the issue of
whether respondent's posters actually caused a substantial harm. The
Court's precedent and logic supporting the position that removal of pos-
ters would serve a substantial interest were unconvincing. And its analy-
sis concerning whether the state's regulatory means would meaningfully
promote that interest was extremely deferential. Finally, the Court did
not suggest any practical alternatives by which Vincent might dissemi-
nate his message. The remainder of this Article addresses these issues,
68. See Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2129-30.
69. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217-28 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 358-59 (1951) (Black, J., dis-
senting) (impropriety of judiciary second-guessing state's choice of means to promote legiti-
mate interests).
71. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2128-36.
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especially as they relate to the dissemination of purely political speech in
the most traditional of public forums.
Aesthetics as a Substantial State Interest:
Improving the Visual Environment
Even if one assumes that the state rightfully may act to create or to
promote a more pleasant living environment for its citizens, there are few
legal standards available by which to evaluate what constitutes such an
environment or to measure the progress toward providing it. Yet, the
Court has gradually been sanctioning that state interest, accepting the
legitimacy of increasingly subjective and nonquantifiable state interests as
it does so.
The Protection of Property Values
While the Court has recognized the governmental goal of improving
the quality or the aesthetics of its citizens' living environment as a legiti-
mate state interest, 72 the cases doing so almost universally involved sub-
stantive due process challenges to zoning regulations. 73  Because the
individual interests implicated by zoning ordinances were generally pri-
vate property rights, the Court determined the validity of zoning laws
under the post-Lochnerian 74 "rational basis" approach.75 During the
same period, the Court also faced a variety of time, place, and manner
restrictions on protected expression in public forums.76 While it has
never satisfactorily defined which state interests are sufficiently substan-
tial to justify such restrictions, 77 the Court historically has deemed sub-
72. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392-97 (1926).
73. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The only case upholding a restriction on speech explicitly using
the preservation of the quality of the living environment as a justification for doing so con-
cerned obscenity, which is not considered to be protected by the first amendment at all. See
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-59 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23
(1973) (The Court used this interest in balancing away any first amendment protection of
obscenity at the definitional stage, allowing it to serve as a reason justifying the exclusion of
obscenity from the first amendment umbrella.).
74. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
75. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934) (such laws valid so long as neither arbitrary nor capricious).
76. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938).
77. Even in the absence of clear parameters, the Court has required that such interests be
more than merely legitimate. They must be either important or substantial. Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 161 (1939).
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stantial those state purposes that have been readily recognizable and
objectively observable. For example, the interests in keeping the streets
open to traffic flow, 78 in preventing two groups with differing, and possi-
bly hostile, views from holding competing rallies in a park at the same
time,79 or in providing adequate police supervision at any large assem-
bly80 have been considered sufficient justifications to restrict or to chan-
nel free expression. In a few early cases, the Court had a mixed reaction
to the question of whether the general preservation of the quality of the
living environment was a sufficient reason to restrict speech. These cases
involved attempts to eliminate litter8 l and to prevent aural assaults on
private citizens within their own homes.8 2 The existence and the scope of
infringements on free expression in those cases, however, were easily per-
ceived, their elimination was obvious to the casual observer, and the de-
gree of reduction of the harms produced could be readily measured.
Recently, the Court's recognition of a state's interest in improving
the aesthetic quality of the community has involved far more tenuous
and subjective governmental purposes.8 3 While there may be little disa-
greement about the desirability of a more attractive living environment,
8 4
there is much disagreement about what constitutes such a setting 5 and
whether the legislative branch of government can or will responsibly pro-
vide it.86 Three cases prior to Vincent8 7 evidence the Court's growing
difficulty in assessing this broad environmental interest as a legitimate
78. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (burden on traffic).
79. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (simultaneous parades).
80. Compare Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 232-33, 236 (1963) (police pro-
tection at scene was sufficient to prevent disorder) with Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315,
317-18, 321 (1951) (police action justified when clear and present danger of riot existed).
81. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (Cleanliness and good appearance of streets
are not sufficient reasons for abridging free speech.).
82. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (state may prohibit use of loudspeakers on
trucks traveling on residential streets).
83. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984) (visual aesthetics);
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion) (visual aesthetics);
Schad v. Burough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (residential character).
84. See Schad v. Burough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 85-86 (1981) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
85. See Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the Dilemmas,
80 MICH. L. RPv. 355, 357, 396-97 n.126 (1982).
86. A recent newspaper poll in Los Angeles revealed that its populace had less confidence
that the city council zoning decisions would benefit the community than in the city's perform-
ance in providing any other governmental service. Most in L.A. Are Satisi fed Despite the Fear
of Crime, L.A. Times, Mar. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
87. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion); Schad
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427
U.S. 50 (1976).
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justification for limiting free speech in the public forum. While all three
decisions tentatively recognized this state interest, two contained impli-
cations that the speech involved merited less than full first amendment
protection. 88 The third case emphasized that any public forum regula-
tion should produce a measurable reduction in at least a clearly recogniz-
able, if not unique, environmental harm in order to be constitutionally
valid.
89
The first case to present a true confrontation between property
rights and restrictions on free speech was Young v. American Mini Thea-
ters.90 In Young, the Court upheld a Detroit zoning ordinance that at-
tempted to disperse various types of enterprises offering adult-oriented
entertainment 91 throughout the city on the premise that a concentration
of such establishments in a small area would lead to a deterioration in the
character of the neighborhood. 92 The interest the city was attempting to
protect appeared to be the quality of a particular living environment.
Yet Detroit was not really concerned with the aesthetic attractiveness of
the community.93 Rather, the basic harm that the city was attempting to
avoid was the creation of skid-row areas that attracted undesirable ten-
ants, lowered property values, caused an increase in crime, and en-
couraged residents and businesses to move elsewhere. 94 While Young
88. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 506 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(commercial speech is regulable on grounds not permissible when dealing with fully protected
speech); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69-70 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(offensive language deserves a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude of protection).
89. In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1981), perhaps because
the majority of the Court did not consider the nature of the speech involved relevant to its
analysis, the ultimate decision was the only one of the three cases to invalidate the regulation
before the Court. See infra notes 98-108 & accompanying text.
90. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
91. Adult-oriented fare was defined as "Specified Sexual Activities," which were catego-
rized as: human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal; acts of human masturba-
tion, sexual intercourse, or sodomy; fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic
region, buttock, or female breast. Id. at 53 n.4; see DETROIT, MICH., ZONING ORDINANCE,
§ 32.0007 (Nov. 2, 1972), cited in Young, 427 U.S. at 53. In comparison, the Court has held
expressly that material which contains the following elements would satisfy the element of
patent offensiveness in its present definition of obscenity: patently offensive representations or
descriptions of ultimate sex acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; or patently offen-
sive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition
of the genitals. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
92. Young, 427 U.S. at 54-55.
93. Visual appearances was not advanced as a state interest in Young.
94. Young, 427 U.S. at 55. Such negative effects of expression have often been referred to
as "secondary effects." Id. at 71 n.34 (plurality opinion); see also Linmark Assoc., Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977). While the Court has never clearly defined
"secondary effects," in Young the Court's analysis seemed to allow it to permit a limited de-
gree of content-oriented regulation so long as the regulation was not motivated by a desire to
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clearly can be considered a decision that approved the city's attempt to
protect general property values,95 it is also true that property values are
statistically measurable. Specific threats to those values, and their subse-
quent elimination, are also objectively verifiable, for example, through
records of criminal arrest or property transfer. Thus, Young is more
readily explainable in terms of the Court's historical willingness to up-
hold governmental interests that are measurable than in terms of its ap-
parent recognition of a broad aesthetic state interest to justify regulating
expression.
96
Moreover, Young is weakened as precedent for more broadly based
aesthetic public forum restrictions because several members of the Court
pointed out that the palpably offensive expression involved in Young
could be restricted by the state on grounds that might be insufficient if
applied to such fully protected speech as political discourse. 97
Protecting the Quality of the Community
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim98 presented a situation similar
in many respects to Young, but one in which the Court reached a very
different result. In Schad, a zoning ordinance banned any form of live
entertainment within the geographical confines of a particular city bor-
ough. The appellant was convicted of allowing live nude dancing inside
his Mount Ephraim establishment.99
The borough's justifications for prohibiting nude dancing were two-
fold. First, the borough sought to preserve the residential nature of the
suppress certain expression. In Young, while the specific harm was caused by speech, the
harm was secondary to the speech in that the location of the speech, rather than its content per
se, was the actual cause of the problem. The impact on any particular listener of the message
and the form of the message were not the harms the city sought to prevent. Detroit never
maintained that exposure to this particular speech had hurt anyone. In fact, the harm may
have been caused by individuals who had never been exposed to the speech. The speech
merely created an atmosphere that seemed to attract a concentration of undesirable individu-
als, ultimately leading to a depreciation in property values. Once the theatres' locations were
altered, though they continued to exist within the forum, the content no longer caused those
harms. Id. at 58 n.15.
95. See also Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (town-
ship asserted that "for sale" signs on lawns would lower property values by increasing neigh-
borhood segregation).
96. See supra notes 77-80 & accompanying text.
97. Young, 427 U.S. at 70-71 (plurality opinion).
98. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
99. While the establishment was located in a commercial area, the Mount Ephraim code
did not consider live entertainment a permitted use there. While three establishments in the
same area did offer live musical entertainment, they were in existence prior to the adoption of
the zoning codes and thus qualified as "non-conforming" uses under the ordinance. Id. at 62-
64 nn.l, 3.
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community by limiting the number of commercial establishments. °°
Second, the borough sought to exclude certain businesses that would
pose unique social problems to the community.' 0 ' These problems, ac-
cording to the borough, included parking, trash disposal, police protec-
tion, and medical facilities. 102 As in Young, the borough was motivated
by concerns about the community environment. Once more, however,
the municipality did not assert a purely aesthetic interest.
10 3
In evaluating the two asserted governmental interests in Schad, the
Court did not explicitly find either to be insubstantial. 04 As a result,
Schad can be viewed as a reaffirmation of Young in terms of the Court's
implicit willingness to recognize the quality of the community as an in-
terest sufficiently important to support a properly drawn time, place, and
manner restriction. Schad, however, is not an extension of Young. For,
as in Young, the Schad Court did not validate the concept that abstract
qualities, such as physical appearance or attractiveness, are themselves
sufficient state interests in the free speech domain. Rather, the Court
concentrated on verifiable community service problems that could be
jeopardized by the expression that the borough had attempted to pro-
hibit. As in Young, the burdens on those services and their consequent
reduction or elimination could be subject to objective, even statistical,
verification. 10 5 The harms to the borough's interests and the effectiveness
of the particular ordinance in alleviating them were both amenable to
measurable proof. The Court, then, did not have to face the question of
100. Id. at 72.
101. Id. at 73.
102. Id. at 72-73.
103. It could, however, be argued that the state's interest in maintaining the borough as a
residential, rather than a commercial, district is an aesthetic interest. See Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
However, even such minimal scrutiny cases do not speak in terms of visual aesthetics, or the
physical appearance of the community. Rather, they are concerned with population density,
traffic control, and disturbing noises. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
104. The Court evaluated the state's asserted interests in light of the regulation that pur-
portedly advanced them, ultimately finding that, on the facts, the harms either did not exist or
were not advanced by the challenged ordinance. Schad, 452 U.S. at 72-75.
105. It would not seem difficult for a city to demonstrate an intolerable burden on its trash
disposal or parking facilities objectively or on its ability to supply police protection or supervi-
sion if such interests actually were threatened. In fact, the city's ability to offer adequate police
supervision always has been considered a relevant factor in administering time, place, and
manner restrictions on parade permits. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963);
cf Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (police order requiring speaker to refrain from
making inflammatory remarks upheld). While determining the number of commercial estab-
lishments that objectively may undermine the character of a predominantly residential neigh-




how to evaluate threats to, or the promotion of, visual attractiveness.
Such threats would seem particularly unamenable to objective
measurement.
Perhaps more significantly, the Court applied an intensity of judicial
review greater than that in Young. While assuming that the borough's
general purposes were legitimate, the Court required the borough to ar-
ticulate and support the contention that its true concern was harm to the
community's aesthetic values and that its regulation was truly aimed at
alleviating that harm. 10 6 The Court may have been concerned that the
borough might have assumed from the Young decision that live nude
dancing could be presumed to impose sufficient harms on the community
environment to justify its total prohibition, without any specification of
secondary harms, merely because it offended the community.10 7 Thus,
the Court's search for clearly enunciated and objective harm may have
been an attempt to clarify its position that any expression protected by
the first amendment, no matter how intrinsically offensive, cannot arbi-
trarily be banned on the basis of offensiveness alone. 10 8
Promoting Visual Aesthetics
The Court, however, did not reaffirm the skeptical approach evi-
denced in Schad toward restrictions on speech ostensibly intended to im-
prove the quality of the living environment. Instead, in Metromedia v.
106. The Court, however, did not require the borough to choose the least restrictive means
for alleviating its asserted harms, such as providing additional city services or allowing such
entertainment at those times when commmunity services are relatively unburdened. Compare
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (required city to choose least restric-
tive alternative) with Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (did not mention
alternatives).
107. -Schad, 452 U.S. at 72-74. For a discussion of such secondary harms, see Young, 427
U.S. at 54-55; supra note 93.
108. The net result of Schad might best be explained as an indication by the Court that it
wished to see actual evidence that the borough's regulation did in fact support the interests
that it purported to serve. This approach shifts the Court's focus from attempting to evaluate
the substantiality of the state's interest to attempting to determine the degree of congruency
between those articulated interests and the means the state has adopted to promote them. This
might provide a possible solution for those cases in which the Court lacks the ability to judge
the importance of such immeasurable interests as aesthetics or visual appearance of the envi-
ronment. Given the difficulty of judging aesthetic values to be more than merely legitimate,
but in fact substantial, the Court could merely defer to the legislative judgment that its inter-
ests are valid. The Court could then concentrate its scrutiny on the means that the govern-
ment has chosen to further those interests to determine whether the protection of the stated
interests was, in fact, the actual purpose of the ordinance in question. In Schad, while the
Court did not demand the precise fit between the borough's purported interests and the means
chosen to preserve them that the most heightened judicial scrutiny might require, the Court
did require an objectively reasonable degree of tailoring between the government's means and
its ends.
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San Diego,10 9 the Court endorsed increased state power to promote a
more attractive living environment through the use of time, place, and
manner regulations at the expense of free speech. In Metromedia, a San
Diego ordinance effectively prohibited all off-premises outdoor advertis-
ing display signs" with certain limited exceptions, including one that
permitted temporary political campaign signs.I1 ' While maintaining that
it would apply a balancing test to the facts, the Court, without meaning-
ful discussion, stated that there could be no "substantial doubt that the
twin goals the ordinance seeks to further [traffic safety and promoting
aesthetic values] . . .are substantial governmental goals."
' "12
The aesthetics issue, however, was worthy of discussion." 13  In
neither Young nor Schad had the city maintained that it was attempting
to promote the visual appearance of the neighborhood. In those cases,
the government sought to protect such concrete interests as city property
values, the availability of community services, or the more tenuous, but
objectively identifiable, difference between commercial and residential
districts. Moreover, none of the precedents cited by the Court suggest
that the promotion of visual aesthetics suffices as a substantial reason for
limiting free expression. Rather, they suggest that aesthetics are a suffi-
ciently legitimate interest to withstand attacks that the government has
acted without a rational basis."I 4 A case that perhaps best straddles the
line between an identifiable and measurable harm to neighborhood ap-
pearance and the immeasurability of what is most pleasing to the eye
involved an attempt by a city to prevent litter. In Schneider v. State," 5
109. 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion).
110. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE, 10,795 (Mar. 14, 1972).
111. Id. § 101.0700(F)(12).
112. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08. The Court cited Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), to support its argument that the city had a legitimate interest
in promoting traffic safety, but Railway Express was decided at a time when commercial
speech was given no first amendment protection. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942). In support of the city's efforts to promote the aesthetic appearance of the environment,
the Court cited Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); and Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In none of
these cases did the Court find that the government had infringed on an individual's fundamen-
tal rights.
113. Because traffic safety was not at issue in Vincent, traffic safety as a substantial govern-
ment interest is beyond the scope of this Article.
114. Thus, Penn Central and Berman applied the low degree of scrutiny the Court tradi-
tionally has invoked when a party has challenged governmental action as a violation of the
taking clause. See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (City zoning ordinance
placing building type and density restrictions on appellant's land was not facially invalid as a
taking.). Belle Terre involved living arrangements between unrelated parties to which, once
more, the Court adopted a very low level of judicial scrutiny.
115. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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the Court held that litter prevention was not a sufficiently substantial
interest to justify a time, place, and manner restriction on the public
streets. 116 Thus, until the Metromedia case, the state's interest in pro-
tecting the visual appearance of the public streets clearly would not have
justified any limitations on the dissemination of speech in a public forum.
An additional, but understandable, flaw in Metromedia is that the
Court's reasoning ignores whether an aesthetic interest is sufficiently sub-
stantial to justify infringements on free speech. The Court instead fo-
cused on whether those who passed the ordinance reasonably could have
believed that billboards could pose an aesthetic evil. 1 7 The Court's def-
erence to legislative judgment seems to be the inevitable result of trying
to distinguish between an important interest and a merely legitimate
one,' 18 in an area in which legal standards are totally underdeveloped
and perhaps not amenable to development. The best the Court could do
was to try to discern whether the ordinance was in fact content-neutral,
and particularly whether it harmed all speech equally. If it did, this
would validate the city's assertion that it was trying to promote a neutral
aesthetic interest. Unfortunately, the Court's uncritical acceptance of
the aesthetic harm caused by San Diego's billboards forecloses any fur-
ther argument that concern with a neighborhood's visual appearance
should not meet the substantiality requirement of the time, place, and
manner test.
Yet the holding in Vincent' 19 does not necessarily follow from Met-
romedia. While the Court ultimately overturned the ordinance in Met-
romedia, the majority accepted the validity of a total ban on all
commercial billboards. 20 The Court emphasized, however, that com-
mercial speech is not fully protected speech. Commensurate with its
subordinate first amendment position, commercial speech can be subject
to modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of non-
commercial expression. 21 This factor alone might explain why the
116. Id. at 162.
117. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510-11. The Court's approach here is analogous to that
used in equal protection cases, when it approaches legislation with the most minimal of judicial
scrutiny. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976); Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
118. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 219-21 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
120. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 528 (Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); id. at 542
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 564-65 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 570 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 506 (plurality opinion); id. at 536 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 779-80 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Court gave the ordinance less than exacting scrutiny. Thus, while the
Court might conclude that temporary posters affixed to utility poles
cause aesthetic problems and therefore can be regulated, political posters
might be immune from the Metromedia rationale.
In Vincent, however, the Court, again without serious discussion,
proclaimed that the aesthetic interests that the Metromedia Court had
applied only to commercial speech suddenly applied universally to all
speech.122 The Court endorsed the implication in Metromedia that, if a
city restricts all speech to an equal degree, the Court will not second-
guess its reasons for doing so or the manner in which it is done.1
2 3
The Court's analysis of the city's interest in Vincent poses two prob-
lems. First, the Court was unable in either Vincent or Metromedia to
define the parameters of legitimate aesthetic interests or to set the stan-
dards to be applied to particular cases in order to evaluate whether the
rule-making body in fact is pursuing an identifiable, much less an impor-
tant, state interest. Second, the Vincent Court did not evaluate whether
the prohibited expression significantly threatened the state's aesthetic in-
terest. The Court was not truly balancing the relevant factors.
Admittedly, it is difficult to make visual aesthetics a definable state
interest, even if the Court arbitrarily makes it a legal one. The Los Ange-
les ordinances set clear standards, 124 but there is no proof that prohibited
matter causes substantial visual blight 125 or clutter. 1 26 An allegation that
122. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2130-32, 2135-36.
123. An independent danger of the Court's recognition of visual aesthetics as valid justifi-
cation for limiting access to the public forum is that, without changing his form or manner of
presentation, the speaker is unable to channel his expression around the restriction. But cf.
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (The
Court upheld a rule limiting speakers' opportunities to express their message because rule
allowed speakers' alternative means of expression within forum.). Unlike a parade or assem-
bly, which present traffic or supervision problems only at specific times and places, posters
causing aesthetic harm may not be used at anytime, nor apparently at any place, within the
particular forum.
124. See Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE art. I, ch. 9, Div. 52, § 91.5201 (1980)
(definitions of signs); id. § 91.5202 (construction, alteration, repair of signs); id. § 91.5204
(1976) (projection signs); id. § 91.5206 (roof signs); id. § 91.5207 (marquee and cloth signs); id.
§ 91.5208 (outdoor advertising sructures and advertising statuaries in fire district); id.
§ 91.5209 (outdoor advertising structures); id. § 91.5210 (advertising statuary); id. § 91.5211
(post signs); id. § 91.5212 (subdivision advertising structures); see also id. art. VIII, ch. 2,
§ 28.01 (1970) (handbills-distribution); id. § 28.02 (handbills-permission premises); id.
§ 28.03 (1983) (handbills, signs-building permission); id. § 28.04 (handbills-public places
and objects); id. § 28.04.1 (handbills, signs-attachment to utility poles, other objects); id.
§ 28.05 (handbills, signs-beach or tideland of city).
125. "Blight" is defined as "[a]ny malignant influence of obscure or mysterious origin;
anything which withers hopes or prospects, or checks prosperity." I THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 919 (1978).
126. Clutter is defined as: "(2) To run together or collect in knots or heaps; to crowd
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signs cause visual blight requires a subjective judgment that the incre-
mental addition to the appearance of the streets is visually harmful. Sim-
ilarly, while any addition to the public street scene may increase visual
clutter if it creates dissonance, the harm caused by dissonance is purely
subjective. After all, great art often is based on the very principle of
dissonance. Thus, the lack of workable standards and the inherent sub-
jectivity in evaluating the degree of harm to the state's interest make a
purported aesthetic interest particularly difficult to apply.
Aesthetics: Is There a Workable Legal Standard?
The saying "beauty is in the eye of the beholder," as reiterated by
Justice Brennan in Vincent,127 is trite and overworked, but it is over-
worked because it is so true. In assessing what produces a more visually
pleasing environment, a reviewing court either must defer to the legisla-
tive body, thus undermining the assertion that it is using more than the
most minimal scrutiny, or must address the question itself. If a court
chooses to confront squarely the substantiality of the asserted aesthetic
interest, it must either rely on its own tastes or point of view, or rely on
expert witnesses to supply a standard for good taste. The reviewing
judge may have difficulty knowing whether to evaluate the city's goals
from a sensual point of view or from an intellectual one. If the judge
relies solely on his own senses, legal arguments are irrelevant. If the
judge relies on intellectual arguments, he ultimately must choose to side
with the most persuasive critics. Furthermore, he must act without stan-
dards to guide him because there are no preexisting legal definitions of
beauty or pleasing visual appearance. The judge may even be asked to
ignore completely his own sensory perceptions and to evaluate from the
small mountain of legal affidavits sitting before him whether the ordi-
nance will prevent community visual blight.
A court might attempt to adopt a more objective approach by analo-
gizing the situation to those cases presenting a "captive audience" prob-
lem, in which an unwilling recipient has free expression thrust upon him
against his will. This problem can arise when the listener or viewer
wishes to avoid exposure to the words or ideas of the speaker, as in the
case of "offensive" speech, 128 or when the recipient does not wish the
together; (3) To run in crowded and bustling disorder... ; (5) To heap or crowd together in a
disorderly way; (6) To crowd (a place or space) with a disorderly assemblage of things; (7) To
throw into mental confusion and disorder .... 2 id. at 541.
127. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2138 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
128. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1970).
January 1986] PUBLIC FORUM REGULATIONS
mode or manner of expression to disturb his privacy, regardless of its
content. 129
The state's interest in enhancing aesthetic appearance or the quality
of the living environment is clearly aimed at protecting individuals from
intrusions on their privacy. Intrusions may range from the blaring sound
truck roving neighborhood avenues 130 to relatively unobtrusive station-
ary signs on commercial boulevards.1 3 1 In balancing the rights of the
audience to escape intrusion against the rights of the speaker to be heard,
the Court in the past has attempted to gauge the degree of intrusion by
assessing the audience's reasonable expectations of privacy 132 and the
ability of an offended member of that audience to avoid further sensory
bombardment. 133 In the case of the sound truck that intrudes upon the
listener in his home, the Court has found the right of the captive listener
to prevail because he is truly captive. 134 On the other hand, when the
listener leaves the sanctity of the home, and the assault can be terminated
by merely averting one's eyes, the speaker's rights generally have pre-
vailed. 135 Therefore, under the captive audience theory, the promotion of
visual aesthetic interests in the public streets should not provide grounds
129. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pol-
lak, 343 U.S. 451, 468-69 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105,
110 (1932).
130. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562
(1948).
131. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 108 (1932). At the time of Packer, billboards
presenting commercial speech did not have first amendment protection. Valentine v. Chresten-
sen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (commercial speech not deserving of first amendment protection).
132. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1975); Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
307-08 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971);
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626-27 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87
(1949).
133. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville. 422 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1975); Spence v. Washing-
ton, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971).
134. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949). But see Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558,
562 (1948) (Court held unconstitutional a city ordinance forbidding the use of sound amplifica-
tion devices in public places without police permission and prescribing no standards for the
exercise of police discretion).
135. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (Movies containing
nudity displayed at a drive-in visible from a public road are protected speech.); Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (Jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" displayed in a public
courthouse is protected speech.). But see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
305-08 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that commuters should be free from the in-
trusion of political advertising on buses). In no public forum case dealing with fully protected
speech has the Court held that merefear of offensiveness to an individual listener could justify
a restriction on such speech. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518 (1972).
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for restricting speech. 136
Moreover, when the state moves to prevent or eliminate visual clut-
ter on its public streets to protect the sensibilities of the community, it
must be acutely aware that any community is composed of a group of
individuals. There are certainly a great number of such individuals who
have no objection to, and presumably may even welcome, political or
advertising signs on the street. 137 Yet, sanctioning this aesthetic interest
would allow the community majority to decide that the first amendment
rights of those who welcome advertising must give way to the majority's
desire to create a more visually pleasing environment.1 38 In prior "audi-
ence sensibility" cases, the Court has not allowed a majoritarian consen-
sus on tastefulness or good appearance to overcome first amendment
rights in a public forum. 139 The Vincent case places the Court in the odd
position of refusing to allow the city to protect its populace from public
exposure to disrupting, annoying, and truly offensive thoughts and
ideas, 14° while allowing the city to protect its populace from the visual,
though not cerebral, dissonance caused by temporary posters on their
136. The fact that the speaker has an alternative means of disseminating his information
generally has not been mentioned as a relevant consideration in these cases. See Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). But see FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (alternative speaker or audience access a consideration in
broadcast media forum).
137. Relatively recently, the Court has begun to grant increasing importance to audience
rights, as well as to speakers' rights, as a value meant to be included within the protection of
the first amendment. See Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92
(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 756-57 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972). As the Court itself
has asserted, "[we have not] recognized any such limitation on the independent right of the
listener to receive the information sought to be communicated, despite the fact that there may
be alternative means for the listener to receive such information." Virginia Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 757 n.15.
138. The odd result of the Vincent case is that one could carry a profane poster on any
public sidewalk, regardless of the offense it might cause innocent passersby, but one could not
affix that poster to public cross-wires nearby because the presence of any temporarily attached
poster offends the city's concept of an aesthetic environment. Compare Vincent, 104 S. Ct at
2118 (city's interest in aesthetics sufficient justification for a ban on posting signs on public
property) with Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (A state may not make the public
display of the words "Fuck the Draft" a criminal offense.).
139. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion), the
plurality did not consider the offensiveness of political ads to be a relevant factor. Nor did the
Court in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) or Lehman consider the forum involved
a public one, let alone a traditional one. Id. at 748-50; Lehman, 418 U.S. at 301-02; see also
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (Nudity shown in drive-in movies
may not be prohibited on the grounds that it may be offensive to citizens. "Much that we
encounter offends our aesthetic ... sensibilities.").
140. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (Among the functions of free speech
are to invite dispute, to induce a condition of unrest, and to stir people to anger.).
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light poles. Even in those cases in which individual audience interests
might be deemed substantial, the preferable remedy would be to direct
the particular mode or manner of expression to a different time141 or
place 142 in the forum. For example, a city could require a sound truck to
turn down its soundtrack or to direct it elsewhere, rather than to turn it
off. The net result is that, in trying to establish a standard for evaluating
what constitutes a visually pleasing environment, a reviewing court must
look either to itself or attempt to gauge the public's point of view.
Should it attempt to do the former, it has no legal standards upon which
to rely. Should it attempt the latter, it allows the values and tastes of the
majority to overwhelm those of the willing minority, a result inconsistent
with first amendment principles.
Judging the Substantiality of the Harm
Apart from the difficulties inherent in trying to define aesthetics, the
Court's attempt to recognize aesthetics or the quality of the living envi-
ronment as a substantial state interest creates a second analytical prob-
lem. The Court tends to accept the interest's substantiality in a general
sense without truly facing the aesthetic problem as posed in a specific
case. One may accept that the maintenance of certain city boulevards as
examples of untarnished natural beauty is an important interest, 43 but it
is not clear that every form of communication along that boulevard tar-
nishes it to an equal degree. For example, the billboards affected by the
San Diego ordinance were defined as "large, immobile and permanent
structures, 144 which were designed to stand out from their surround-
ings. Though the messages they carried might have changed occasion-
ally, the billboards were always there, and because of their size and
locations, they tended to dominate the horizon and the skyline in a man-
ner that small posters located closer to the ground would not.
141. Even in the nonpublic forum of electronic broadcasting, which has the capacity to
invade the sanctity of the home and to expose children to offensive but non-obscene language,
the Court did not endorse explicitly an absolute prohibition of offensive expression. Rather,
the Court suggested that the optimal solution would allow broadcast of the material at a time
that would be less likely to intrude on privacy interests. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
750-51 (1978).
142. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949); cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976) (offensive movies still available at other locations within the
forum).
143. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 530-31 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
144. Id. at 502 (plurality opinion) (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal.
3d 848, 870, 610 P.2d 407, 419, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 522 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)
(plurality opinion)).
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In addition, a limited amount of "visual clutter" on or surrounding
a street already having a number of eye-catching distractions should not
create a significant degree of harm. If a city required that temporarily
attached posters, irrespective of their content, be removed after a rela-
tively short period of time, their effect on the environment would cer-
tainly be short-lived, if not relatively insubstantial. From the opposite
perspective, if an ordinance bars only temporary signs attached to public
property and bans none of those surrounding them, it is difficult to ac-
cept that elimination of the temporary signs will produce a substantial
benefit. The benefit in Vincent was even more attenuated because the
Court arguably could have enjoined the application of the ordinance to
the political posters at issue, without having to void the law altogether.
145
Thus, in terms of seriously infringing on the city's aesthetic interests,
Vincent's signs seemed to create little more than a petty annoyance.
Nor did the posters in any way interfere or appear incompatible
with the primary function of the city streets:146 to move traffic in a rea-
sonably efficient manner. 147 The posters, affixed to utility poles by little
more than gravity, 148 also did not in any way deface or cause permanent
damage to public or private property, as is the case with typical urban
graffiti.' 49 Finally, even if one accepts the general position that providing
a peaceful or nondistracting atmosphere is an incidental purpose of the
public streets, 50 it is also true that, until recently, the use of these same
145. Vincent's original attack, and one on which he won in the appellate court, was that
the Los Angeles ordinance was invalid on its face. Taxpayers for Vincent v. Members of the
City Council, 682 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). The Supreme
Court found the facial attack unsupportable. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2127-28. Yet, in concen-
trating on the validity of the ordinance to the facts of Vincent itself, the Court could have
upheld the statute as written while holding that its application to purely political speech was
invalid.
146. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (The issue should be whether
the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular
place at a particular time.).
147. In contrast, parades and assemblies often temporarily interfere with traffic, yet pa-
rades and assemblies of limited duration on the public streets garner a high degree of constitu-
tional protection. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972); Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963). But see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-
56 (1965) (implication that the nondiscriminatory application of a statute closing all streets to
parades and meetings might be permissible).
148. The posters were draped over the poles, and then one side of the drape was stapled to
the other. There was no actual attachment to the surface of the poles themselves. Vincent, 104
S. Ct. at 2122.
149. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 549-50 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (allowing off-site billboards would inexorably sanction uncontrollable urban graffiti
under the right of access to a public forum).
150. Cf id. at 530-31 (Brennan, J., concurring) (Although the beauty of some areas would
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streets as a traditional public forum, a "marketplace of ideas,"'' was a
valid incidental purpose as well.
Developing Adequate Scrutiny for Aesthetic Regulations
As discussed above, the courts face great difficulties in judging the
substantiality of certain state interests,152 and in objectively identifying
the standards that delineate these interests, particularly in areas as sub-
jective as visual aesthetics or the quality of the living environment. The
judiciary, however, has other potentially effective ways of setting reason-
able parameters on the states' exercise of their police powers to promote
visual aesthetics. For instance, a court could require a state to demon-
strate clearly the manner in which its aesthetic regulations will promote
its purported interest. By carefully examining the state's rationale for
choosing particular regulations to promote its interests, the court could
gauge more accurately the state's asserted importance of these interests.
This inquiry would be particular useful in situations in which the regula-
tions impinge on highly protected individual interests, especially rights
stemming from the first amendment.1
53
A "Narrowly Tailored" Means Test
At first glance, it might seem that a searching examination of the
state's regulatory means is an approach that the Supreme Court has
adopted because the Court already requires that any regulation of a pub-
lic forum that affects free expression, even incidentally, be "narrowly tai-
lored" 54 to serve the substantial interests being protected.155 As applied,
be enhanced by the elimination of billboards, the beauty of other areas would only slightly be
affected.).
151. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981) (Even a nontraditional forum,
once it is dedicated to expressive activities, should serve as a marketplace of ideas.); Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981) (Even a lim-
ited public forum is obliged to exercise a role as a "marketplace" of ideas.). For further
examples of a dedicated public forum, see City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (public school board meeting); South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (publicly owned municipal theatre).
For examples of a limited public forum, see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military
base); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (city-owned bus system).
152. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 220-21 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also
Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979) (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
153. Theoretically, in such cases the Court should be wary of any state regulation, regard-
less of its policy basis. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1981); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161
(1939).
154. The use of a similar means requirement in other areas, including equal protection,
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however, this standard is often devoid of meaning. If the state is able to
define the harm it is attempting to alleviate with sufficient precision, and
the Court accepts the state's premise that the threatened harm exists, any
regulation phrased to eliminate only that particular threat would be nar-
rowly tailored by definition. In effect, the narrowly tailored test is ap-
plied as if it were actually just a causal "direct" relationship test, 156 or
even no more than a "reasonable relationship" test.
157
This dilution of the narrowly tailored standard is evident in the Met-
romedia1 58 case. In analyzing the regulations on commercial billboards,
the Court purportedly required the city's restrictions on this speech to be
narrowly tailored to serve and directly advance the city's aesthetic inter-
est. 159 The Court, however, dismissed the narrowly tailored requirement
cavalierly, almost as if any regulation that directly served the city's inter-
est in visual appearance would be, without question, sufficiently narrowly
tailored.' 60 Using the Court's rationale, if a city should decide that bill-
boards, as opposed to all forms of outdoor advertising, pose harm,
though not a unique harm, to its aesthetic interests, any regulation limit-
ing or abolishing billboards would be by definition both direct and nar-
rowly tailored.16'
generally has indicated that the Court is adopting a fairly rigid degree of judicial scrutiny. See
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490-92 (1980) (congressional statute sufficiently narrowly
tailored to support heightened scrutiny of congressional affirmative action plan); Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (heightened scrutiny overturning a state regulation based on
alienage); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-17 (1972) (equal protection require-
ment that regulations affecting the first amendment be "narrowly tailored").
155. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
156. The direct relationship test, which initially appeared in the Court's attempt to de-
velop standards controlling state regulation on commercial speech, only requires a causal rela-
tionship between the restriction at issue and the harm the state seeks to alleviate. The test does
not prohibit under- or over-inclusive regulation, and does not ask whether the state might
achieve its purpose with a regulation that has no speech-suppressive effects at all. See Met-
romedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981) (plurality opinion); Central Hud-
son Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980).
157. The reasonable relationship test stems from the post-Lochnerian substantive due pro-
cess cases and requires no more than a rational basis between the state's purposes and the
means chosen to implement them. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
486-88 (1955); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
158. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion).
159. Assuming that a state attempts to regulate commercial speech that concerns lawful
activity and the speech is not misleading, the restriction is valid only if it seeks to implement a
substantial governmental interest, directly advances that interest, and reaches no further than
necessary to accomplish the given objective. Id. at 507; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980).
160. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 508.
161. In applying its "direct relationship" test, the Court found the city's judgment was
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Given the Court's approach in Metromedia, the result of the Court's
means analysis in Vincent 16 2 was preordained. In Vincent the Court rec-
ognized the general state interest in promoting an aesthetically pleasing
environment. Nevertheless, the Court viewed the real evil that the city
sought to prevent as the visual clutter caused by temporary signs affixed
to public property. 163 Given that assumption, the city's remedy was not
just narrowly tailored, it was perfect. The regulations did no more than
eliminate the exact source of the evil the city sought to remedy. Under
the Court's approach, a city could regulate or prohibit a wide variety of
certain selected modes of communication in the name of aesthetics, while
in no way regulating other permitted uses, decorative designs, or aes-
thetic distractions having no speech value at all.164 As Justice Brennan
suggested, the Court's approach is meaningless because it allows the city
to tailor its objective to fit precisely any preferred means rather than tai-
loring its means to fit legitimate, substantial objectives.1
65
The Court's deference to the state's choice of means is not histori-
cally justified. 166 This deference, however, may be the natural result of
the Court's attempt to test the relationship between given forum regula-
tions and the state's asserted, but unidentifiable, interests. 167 A court
"not manifestly unreasonable," and found that the city "may believe" its ordinance was proper
as written, and "could reasonably conclude" that its exemptions were justified. Id. at 509-12.
Such language is normally used when the Court has adopted the most minimal rational basis
scrutiny. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-27 (1961) ("The constitutional safe-
guard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achieve-
ment of the state's objective."); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937)
(State minimum wage law would be constitutional if found to be "reasonable in relation to its
subject" and "adopted in the interests of the community.").
162. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
163. Id. at 2131-32. The Court seemed to accept Vincent's assertion that the placement of
his posters posed no threat to traffic safety.
164. See supra note 67.
165. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2139-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Justice Brennan suggests,
for example, the true objective of the city may be to decrease sign density. Adopting an ordi-
nance banning all signs will serve such a purpose, but would be substantially over-inclusive.
Id. Yet, if the city rephrased its interest to prohibit the visual clutter of all signs, the fit would
be perfect. Conversely, an ordinance that attempted to prevent visual clutter, but prohibits
only certain temporary signs, would be substantially under-inclusive. But if the city rephrased
its objective as reducing the visual clutter caused by the very same temporary signs, the fit
would once again be perfect.
166. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (right to use a public place for
expressive activities may be restricted only for weighty reasons); see also Village of Schaum-
burg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636-38 (1980) (improper to restrict door-to-
door solicitation in order to prevent fraud); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 151
(1943) (improper to restrict door-to-door solicitation, even if to do so will clearly protect
homeowner privacy); see also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (prevention of litter-
ing insufficient interest and punishing leafleteer improper means).
167. The Court's deference, however, ignores the fact that the regulated harm may be
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cannot judge reasonably whether a forum restriction is narrowly tailored
without having first answered the question: "Tailored to do what?"
In contrast to Vincent, the decision in Young16s was supportable be-
cause the harm that the city was attempting to alleviate in that case was
perceived as objective and measurable and was the direct result of the
specific activity the city sought to prevent.1 69 The mere existence of
adult theatres grouped together created an undesirable atmosphere. In
Schad,170 while the harms that the city attempted to alleviate were
presented in an objective and measurable way, those harms were not
unique to the nude dancing that the borough sought to abolish. 171 As a
result, the Court struck down the regulation at issue in Schad. In Met-
romedia and Vincent, however, the threatened harms were less definable
and less measurable1 72 and were in no way unique to the particular
modes of expression that were prohibited. Visual clutter would be
caused by any posters in some neighborhoods, whether temporarily or
permanently attached, and whether they were on a street utility pole or
in the window of an adjacent private building.
The Court may never be able to identify or measure the aesthetic
harms that signs create. The Court clearly can determine, however,
whether the visual clutter created by restricted signs is distinguishable
from other clutter the city allows to go unrestricted. While the Court
might define "visual clutter" to include Vincent's posters and might con-
indistinguishable from a multitude of similar, unregulated harms. In contrast, in Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 67-77 (1981), perhaps because of the Court's suspi-
cion that the challenged regulation was not truly content-neutral, the Court applied the nar-
rowly tailored standard with a high degree of scrutiny, using both an over- and under-
inclusive analysis. Over- and under-inclusiveness review is commonly found in equal protec-
tion cases in which the Court has openly adopted a high degree of scrutiny. See Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390, 402 (1978) (state statute infringing on an individual's right to
marry voided as both over- and under-inclusive); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250, 263-65 (1974) (statute infringing on right to travel voided as both over- and under-
inclusive); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 485-87 (1980) (congressional racial
affirmative action plan in construction trades sustained against claims that statute was both
over- and under-inclusive).
168. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
169. Id. at 54-55, 71. It should be noted that in Young a plurality found the speech in-
volved to be of little value. As a result, the Court adopted a very low degree of scrutiny. Id. at
63-73 (plurality opinion).
170. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
171. The live entertainment prohibited in Schad presented problems no different than
those created by numerous other, clearly allowable, activities. Id. at 73-74. In contrast, in
Metromedia the Court accepted the city's argument that the city ought to be allowed to ex-
empt certain desirable activities from the prohibition, even though these exemptions would
cause the very same visual clutter that the city was seeking to prevent. Metromedia, 453 U.S.
at 513-17.
172. See Costonis, supra note 85, at 396 n.126.
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cede that the prevention of clutter is a valid state objective, the incremen-
tal harm caused by Vincent's temporary political posters is miniscule at
best. Even one poster on a quiet residential street can cause measurable
harm, but that same poster on one of the hundreds of commercial and
industrial avenues in the city adds no unique or incremental harm to the
aesthetic environment. 173 Consequently, application of the city's sign or-
dinance to industrial areas restricts speech without a legitimate reason.
Arguably, it is within the Court's power to amend this situation.
The Court could apply heightened scrutiny to the means chosen by the
state to promote its interests. This would aid the Court in determining
whether the rule-making body truly believes that its interests are substan-
tial, and whether its regulations will significantly further those interests.
This heightened scrutiny could involve a "less restrictive alternatives"
analysis, 174 a "comprehensive plan" analysis to test the overall effect of
the state's regulatory scheme, 175 or the Court's own "narrowly tailored"
standard, with a degree of scrutiny that truly tests the degree of over- or
under-inclusiveness of the state's regulations. 176  Any of these ap-
proaches, or a combination thereof, would also help to ensure that a
given time, place, and manner regulation was untainted by speech sup-
pressive motives.
Less Restrictive Alternatives
Historically, the Court has required the state to demonstrate that
any time, place, and manner regulation of speech promotes the state's
interest in the least speech-restrictive manner possible. Thus, in Schnei-
der v. State,I7 7 the Court, while rejecting the prevention of litter as a
sufficiently substantial interest to justify a prohibition on handbilling in
173. The Los Angeles zoning scheme prohibited Vincent from posting his signs on any
public land within the city limits, regardless of the character of the particular neighborhood in
question. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE art. III, ch. 1, § 12.21(7) (1981) (prohibi-
tion of plates, signs, or advertising matter on any lot in a residential zone); id. art. VIII, ch. 2,
§§ 28.01-.05 (1985) (prohibition and regulations on handbill distribution and posting or plac-
ing of signs within city limits).
174. This approach would have strong historical support. See Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
147-49 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
175. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 531 (Brennan, J., concurring). This approach often has
been suggested by the Court for use in cases involving a purportedly less searching degree of
scrutiny than that assertedly being applied in cases involving the first amendment. See Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978) (taking clause); Nectow v. City
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (taking clause); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395-97 (1926) (police power and taking clause).
176. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 67-77 (1981).
177. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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the public streets,1 78 nonetheless reviewed the means chosen by the state
to promote that interest. Because the ordinance clearly restricted free-
dom of speech in a public forum, the Court required the state to demon-
strate that no other less speech-restrictive means could sufficiently serve
its purposes. 179 Perhaps ignoring the practical difficulties of enforcing
anti-litter laws, the Court felt that punishing the litterer was a sufficiently
viable, and clearly less speech-restrictive, alternative than prohibiting
handbilling.18 0
Similarly, in numerous cases involving restrictions or licensing re-
quirements on neighborhood canvassers,18 1 the Court clearly has recog-
nized the state's interest in protecting its citizens from fraud or
harassment.18 2 But the Court has directed the state to punish those who
commit fraud or who disobey citizens' attempts to protect their pri-
vacy '8 3 rather than to place restrictions on the speakers themselves, even
though restrictions on speech arguably would serve the state's interests in
a much more convenient manner.
Yet this approach poses difficulties both in theory and in applicabil-
ity. The approach creates theoretical difficulties because it allows the
Court to second-guess the legislature without having to face the particu-
lar realities that may confront the rule-making body.184 Problems of ap-
plicability can occur when, as the majority in Vincent suggested, it is the
very mode of expression that causes the harm in question.185 In such a
case, the standard offers no more protection to first amendment rights
than does the Court's present use of the narrowly tailored standard.
Thus, if one accepts the premise that temporary signs do add to visual
clutter, there is no way to preserve completely the state's interest other
than an absolute ban. Allowing the signs only for certain periods of time,
178. Id. at 162.
179. Id. at 162-65.
180. Id. at 162-63.
181. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (licensing
provision for charities not devoting 75% of receipts for charitable purposes); Hynes v. Mayor
& Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (advance written notice for identification purposes
for house-to-house canvasser); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (prohibition of
door-to-door solicitation).
182. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637-38 (1980);
Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 618 (1976); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943).
183. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-49 (1943). But cf Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622,
641-45 (1951) (only commercial speech involved).
184. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 521 (1981); Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 358-60 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
185. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2135-36.
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prescribing their appearance, or exempting certain signs on the basis of
their content' 86 will all detract to some degree from the beneficial effects
of the ordinance. There are no alternative means that will fully protect
the city's interests.
Comprehensive Plans
In Metromedia,1 87 Justice Brennan suggested that comprehensive
plans should be considered as a factor in the review of public forum regu-
lations purporting to promote aesthetic values. This analytical device
would permit the Court to assume that aesthetic concerns are a substan-
tial state interest, and would enable the Court to sidestep the problems of
determining the parameters of that interest or second-guessing the city's
determination that an aesthetic interest exists. Instead, the Court would
require the city to demonstrate that it is addressing its environmental
concerns in a widespread and cohesive manner. The approach is not a
new one. The Court previously used comprehensive plan analysis to de-
termine the constitutionality of zoning laws challenged as denials of sub-
stantive due process on the grounds that they deprived plaintiffs of their
property rights.188
Comprehensive plan analysis might have special value in the first
amendment context. First, it would ensure that the state purposes are
valid and not founded on speech suppressive motives. Second, it would
ensure that the state is not suppressing speech unduly while attempting
to alleviate a relatively insignificant harm. The Court would not have to
base its decision on the validity of a particular regulation by trying to
balance its effectiveness in protecting aesthetics, a factor lacking judicial
standards, against its degree of speech suppression. Rather, the Court
could evaluate the relationship between that particular regulation and
the myriad of others that the city has adopted under the aegis of environ-
mental improvement to be relatively sure that the regulation consistently
and coherently fits into an overall developmental structure. 189 The
186. Some of these alternatives were suggested by Justice Brennan in his Vincent dissent.
Id. at 2142 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Under current law, a content-oriented distinction would
have to be necessary to'serve a compelling state interest and would have to be narrowly drawn
to achieve that end. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
187. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 531 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
188. See supra note 175 & accompanying text.
189. See Costonis, supra note 85, at 455, for a list of factors that the regulatory body
should consider in creating a defensible aesthetic program. These factors include: the clarity
of the standards; the internal coherence of its structure; the rationality of its actual administra-
tion; and the extent to which it needlessly or necessarily restricts free expression.
[Vol. 37
PUBLIC FORUM REGULATIONS
Court could determine whether the city treats identical harms identi-
cally. Conversely, when the Court is faced with an apparent contradic-
tion in the regulations, it would not have to determine whether the harms
involved are significantly different. Moreover, the Court could require
that an overall city beautification plan include regulations that have little
or no effect on free expression, and encompass a variety of commercial,
economic, and individual interests. In this way, the Court could ensure
that aesthetic concerns, rather than speech suppressive motives, are the
basis for any particular regulation.
In the context of a consistent plan of regulation, the Court would be
better able to judge whether the whole framework produces a significant
benefit.190 The Court also would be able to avoid the inherent legal prob-
lem of viewing in isolation any ordinance banning only one form of
communication from an apparently cluttered environment: that the regu-
lation will be subject to challenge as radically under-inclusive and, there-
fore, not narrowly tailored.' 9'
Comprehensive plan analysis might have led to a different result in
Vincent. 192 The city's articulated concern over visual blight was not fur-
thered by any truly comprehensive plan. Los Angeles' complete set of
sign regulations allowed a myriad of advertising messages and logos to
face, overhang, and impinge on the very streets and sidewalks on which
Vincent's political posters were prohibited. 93 While the Court admit-
tedly should be wary of preventing the city from alleviating its visual
clutter one step at a time, in Vincent the steps already had been taken,
and they were very few indeed. Unfortunately, the city's ordinances fell
heavily on the free speech interests of those who did not own or lease
190. While not explicitly endorsing Justice Brennan's comprehensive plan approach, the
plurality in Metromedia implied that a rule-making body's admitted exceptions to any general
prohibition designed to further aesthetics would be given heavy consideration in determining
whether the rule-making body considers its aesthetic interest substantial. An extensive
number of such exceptions, or exceptions covering an extremely broad scope, would tend to
undermine the strength of the legislative assertion that its enunciated state interest is substan-
tially significant or, if significant, substantially threatened. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 520-21.
191. In certain circumstances, the Court does allow a legislative body to attack a wide
range of similar problems "one step at a time," but those cases generally have been ones to
invoke only minimal, or rational basis judicial scrutiny. See McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807-11 (1969) (upheld statute granting absentee ballots to designated
classes, but not to unsentenced inmates awaiting trial because nothing indicated that inmates
were in fact precluded from voting); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
489 (1955) (statute that prohibited the fitting of eyeglasses without a prescription exempted
businesses selling ready-to-wear glasses).
192. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
193. See supra notes 67, 124 & accompanying text.
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property adjacent to the city's public streets. 1
94
In judging the substantiality of the city's interest and the means by
which it sought to promote that interest, the Court neither investigated
the comprehensive nature of the Los Angeles zoning ordinance nor eval-
uated its exceptions. The net result of Vincent is that the Court ulti-
mately has allowed private political speech, and even private commercial
speech, 195 to flow more freely than purely political speech exercised in a
traditional public forum.
Yet, even if it were adopted, the comprehensive plan approach has
disadvantages. While the comprehensive plan approach would allow the
Court to evaluate a particular regulation in the context of a relatively
objective background, it also would require the Court to digest an exten-
sive factual background in order to evaluate the validity of any chal-
lenged ordinance. Also, the Court might be presented with a dilemma if
a particular regulatory provision that impinges on free speech rights is
one of the first steps of a larger comprehensive plan that has yet to be
fully implemented. On the one hand, the Court must rely on a specula-
tive framework of the plan's future application to formulate a presently
binding decision. On the other hand, in order to ensure that the regula-
tions remain speech-neutral, the Court may be forced to hold the rule-
makers to the basic structure of the initial plan, depriving them of the
flexibility to alter its implementation in later stages should the plan prove
to be unworkable or poorly conceived.
Over- and Under-Inclusiveness
The major value of the comprehensive plan requirement is that it
ensures that the rule-making body actually is viewing aesthetic interests
as its ultimate goal. The approach is essentially a standard for reviewing
the state's overall methodology. It would not prevent an isolated portion
194. The Vincent Court did not face the equal protection argument suggested by the fact
that nonproperty owners seemed to be discriminated against in an area involving the funda-
mental right of freedom of expression. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2136 n.34.
195. Any attempt to reconcile the Metromedia and Vincent cases on the issue of allowable
regulatory exceptions could place the Court in an anomalous position. The Court recognized,
within the limited confines of the commercial advertising situation presented in Metromedia,
that business interests could justify exceptions to the city's attempts to promote an aestheti-
cally pleasing environment. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512. Perhaps on-site advertising, while
presenting no less of a threat to the city's environmental interests than off-site advertising, did
deserve to be protected in order best to promote the city's economic or commercial interests.
However, once the Court has allowed recognition of the city's economic interest, it is very
difficult to accept that commercial interests may overcome the aesthetic objectives of the city,
while the same aesthetic interests are still sufficient to overcome political speech in a public
forum.
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of the state's regulatory plan, one infringing heavily on free speech inter-
est without significantly benefitting the state's interests, from garnering
judicial approval.
Another approach that would guard against such an occurrence
would be a meaningful application of the narrowly tailored standard that
the Court currently professes to use. Unlike the comprehensive plan
analysis, this approach would require the Court to evaluate any particu-
lar speech-repressive regulation in isolation. The Court would not deter-
mine whether the ordinance seems consistent with a general plan, but
instead would judge whether the ordinance offers a discernible benefit to
the state's aesthetic goals, its own independent justification. The Court
would judge the "fit" between an aesthetic restriction-in terms of its
purpose, scope, and effect-and the alleged environmental interest the
restriction is designed to promote. The Court ultimately would deter-
mine whether the given regulation was either markedly over- or under-
inclusive in relation to the city's purported aesthetic goals.196
The Schad197 case presents an apt case study of such an approach.
In Schad, the borough argued that its zoning ordinance198 banning live
entertainment served two clear purposes: first, to create a commercial
area that catered only to the immediate purchasing needs of its residents,
and second, to avoid problems associated with live entertainment such as
parking, litter, police protection, and medical facilities. 199 Although the
Court did not expressly reject either interest as illegitimate or insubstan-
tial,2oo it refused to accept either reason as the actual justification for the
ordinance because the ordinance did not effectively serve its stated pur-
poses. In the first case, the ordinance allowed a wide variety of commer-
cial establishments offering goods and services far beyond any citizen's
immediate needs.201 Thus, the ordinance was markedly under-inclusive.
Moreover, the addition of a live entertainment establishment to that wide
196. In the equal protection area, the Court often has used such an approach to demon-
strate that the fit between governmental aims and the means adopted to achieve them do not
have the desired congruency to satisfy a heightened degree of scrutiny. See supra note 167 &
accompanying text.
197. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
198. The Court in Schad actually bifurcated its discussion of the ordinance, treating it as
both a zoning ordinance affecting free expression generally and as a time, place, and manner
regulation. The majority of the Court's discussion concerned the zoning ordinance as a gener-
alized restriction on speech. Id. at 65-74.
199. Id. at 72-73.
200. Nor did it explicitly hold such interests to be substantial. At best, the Court held that
a state regulation impinging on the first amendment must be sufficiently justified. Id. at 67.
201. For example, the zoning ordinances permitted such activities as beauty salons, pet
stores, and retail sales of jewels, clothes, appliances, and automobiles. Id. at 63.
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variety of existing businesses would create only an insignificant addi-
tional harm. As a result, its elimination provided an insignificant benefit.
In that sense, the ordinance was over-inclusive.
20 2
As to the second interest, the Court found no evidence indicating
that live entertainment provided more significant demands on commu-
nity services than any of the other permitted businesses within the bor-
ough. In essence, the ordinance should have treated all businesses
equally, either allowing or prohibiting all. In that sense, the ordinance
was, again, both over- and under-inclusive. 20 3 The Court implied that to
be treated differently, live entertainment would have to present distinct
problems, 2°4 not just minor additional problems.2
0 5
Once more, the Court could have produced a far better reasoned
opinion in Vincent 20 6 had it applied the means analysis used in Schad.
For example, the Court could have challenged the ordinance in Vincent
as markedly under-inclusive in two distinct ways. First, the ordinance
did not ban all temporary signs, or temporarily affixed signs, but only
those on public property. Constitutionally, the ban could have gone
much further and included, for example, all temporary signs visible from
the street.20 7 The harm of visual clutter seems indistinguishable in terms
of ownership of the underlying property. In fact, a distinction between
private and public property only serves to enhance viewpoint discrimina-
tion because, unlike the city, the private property owner is not constitu-
tionally bound to refrain from discriminating against unpopular points of
view. 20
8
202. See supra note 167.
203. Schad, 452 U.S. at 72-74.
204. The Borough argued that live entertainment presented unusual problems, compared
to permitted uses in the area. The Court found that such entertainment did not present any
unique or destructive problems. Id. at 73-74.
205. The Court's strict scrutiny standard applied in Schad, however, may have been
prompted by suspicions about the city's motives. The Schad case involved controversial and,
to a great many people, offensive expression. To limit more serious scrutiny to situations in-
volving offensive speech, however, seems odd, since several members of the Court do not con-
sider offensive expression to be fully protected at all. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 745-48 (1978) (plurality opinion); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,
61-62 (1976). While fully protected speech is less controversial than offensive speech, fully
protected speech should not, for that reason, be given less constitutional protection.
206. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
207. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-12 (1981) (plurality
opinion) (Commercial speech could be totally banned throughout city streets and adjacent
property.).
208. Private parties are not subject to restrictions on governmental action imposed by the
federal Constitution. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (fact that nursing
homes receive public funds not sufficient state action to impose constitutional due process
limitations on their actions); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979)
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Second, the permanence of the sign or poster is irrelevant to the
issue of whether it added clutter to the surrounding neighborhood,
though admittedly the permanent sign would be more amenable to offi-
cial supervision. In contrast, by following the means test set out in Vin-
cent, one reaches the odd result that a political candidate may not attach
his four by six foot campaign poster to a utility pole adjacent to a fifty by
thirty foot private billboard advertising a new record album because his
sign will detract from the aesthetic environment in a manner that the
billboard does not. Yet that odd result is an inevitable consequence of a
statute so markedly under-inclusive so as to prohibit only insubstantial
additions to an already cluttered environment.
The breadth of the ordinance's restrictions suggests that it may have.
been substantially over-inclusive as well. Certainly, there are areas of the
city in which the temporary posting of signs, whether political or com-
mercial, will, at most, increase visual blight to an insignificant degree.
Those who live or work near heavily industrial areas will probably not be
affronted by, or aided by the removal of, temporary campaign posters.20 9
Even in more protected areas of the city that are zoned for activities such
as retail sales, it is difficult to consider a set of ordinances narrowly tai-
lored to remove an identifiable and significant harm, when a prohibited
campaign poster may not be affixed to a utility pole in front of a permit-
ted twenty foot high fast food logo. In such a case, it is difficult to accept
that the political poster has added to a visually distracting or unpleasant
atmosphere in any meaningfully significant manner.
Perhaps the most speech-protective approach that the Court could
adopt would be an amalgam of the comprehensive plan analysis and a
more stringent application of its present narrowly tailored means stan-
dard. The comprehensive plan test would determine the validity of the
state's overall legislative purpose, and the narrowly tailored means test
would ensure that any particular regulation with speech-repressive effects
is independently justified. In light of these options, it is most dishearten-
ing to find that the Court has adopted neither approach. Rather, the
Court continues to apply its current, and purportedly demanding, public
forum standards in a deferential manner. Once more, it appears that,
regardless of content, so long as all speech is treated equally, even if
(because private affirmative action plan does not involve state action, no constitutional viola-
tion); Jackson v. Metropolitian Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (private utility company not
subject to fourteenth amendment because no state action found).
209. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 530-31 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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equally harshly,210 the Court will find that any first amendment re-
straints on legislative power have been satisfied. If the Court continues
to defer to the state's choice of regulatory means without considering the
actual effect of the regulation either in curing the harms the state main-
tains are present or in inflicting damage on free speech interests, the judi-
cial balance will inevitably weigh in favor of the state.
Alternative Access: Balancing Away the Speaker's Harm
An additional approach that may tip the balance in the state's favor
is to designate the harm imposed upon a speaker by the regulation in
question. Thus, if one could argue that, despite the questioned regula-
tion, a speaker still has numerous alternative means by which to dissemi-
nate his message, the degree of first amendment injury may seem
insubstantial. The speaker can always make use of his alternative access.
The alternative access element that the Court currently uses in eval-
uating the validity of governmental restrictions on public forums is of
relatively recent origin.211 In seminal cases, once the Court found an
infringement on speech, it scrutinized the state interest that the regula-
tion sought to protect and the means the state employed to promote its
asserted interest. 212 A speaker's opportunity to disperse his message by
other means had little relevance to the Court. For example, it was not
relevant to the Court in Schneider213 that the speaker could have dissem-
inated his message in other ways than by handbills, 214 nor was it relevant
in Brown v. Louisiana215 that the speakers could have easily offered their
message somewhere other than in a public library.216
Clearly, the purpose of evaluating the speaker's alternative access is
to judge the degree of harm to the speaker's free speech rights. That
210. Id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that all billboards, regardless of con-
tent, could be prohibited).
211. Compare Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(alternative access element used) and United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (alternative access element used) with Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (alternative access element not used) and Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 (1939) (alternative access element not used). The Court in Perry cited Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) and Schneider as support for its three-part time,
place, and manner public forum test, but neither Grayned nor Schneider asserted that a
speaker's alternative access is a relevant consideration in judging such regulations.
212. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
575-78 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162-65 (1939).
213. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
214. Id. at 163.
215. 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (plurality opinion).
216. Id.
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degree of infringement has real relevance if the Court is truly engaging in
a balancing process. In certain situations, evidence that the speaker has
no alternative means to disseminate his message could strengthen the
speaker's argument. 217 Yet it is difficult to conceive of many such cases.
Even though handbills and sandwich boards are seemingly obsolete, with
the development of a myriad of forms of modern communication-mass
media, electronic and print, and even the mails-theoretically there is
nearly always alternative access to a desired audience.
Yet, if alternative speaker access is to be an element of the balancing
process, the mere suggestion of this access should not suffice. Instead,
the Court expressly should evaluate the feasibility of the proposed alter-
natives. The Court should require that a given speaker have available
realistic alternatives to disseminate effectively his particular message.
In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingsboro,218 for ex-
ample, the Court adopted a probing degree of inquiry that evaluated the
actual viability of alternative speaker access. In Linmark, the township
justified its prohibition on the placement of "for sale" or "sold" signs on
residential lawns as an attempt to discourage white flight, to protect
property values, and to promote more integrated neighborhoods. The
township also argued that the prohibition did not seriously impinge on
the first amendment because it banned only one form of communica-
tion.219 The Court disagreed, noting that none of the many possible al-
ternative channels of information about home sales were as effective as
lawn signs. 220 While conceding the possible effectiveness of certain alter-
natives, the Court pointed out that newspaper advertising and real estate
listings "involve more cost and less autonomy than 'For Sale' signs. ' 221
Thus, the Court was willing to judge realistically the actual effectiveness
217. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1981). In Schad, the
Court also implied that the speaker had a right of access to some location in his desired forum.
Id.
218. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). In contrast, by accepting stipulated findings of the importance of
billboards to advertisers in Metromedia, the Court effectively eliminated any inquiry into alter-
native speaker access. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 497 (1981) (plu-
rality opinion).
219. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93. The case is distinguishable from Vincent because the city
ordinance at issue in Linmark was not content-neutral. Nonetheless, in assessing the degree of
harm to free speech interests, the Court in Linmark analyzed the ordinance as a time, place,
and manner regulation. Id. Conversely, because the case involved commercial speech, the
Court could have adopted an even less demanding degree of scrutiny.
220. It was not obvious, however, that serious homebuyers shopped by way of lawn signs
rather than through newspaper ads or by consulting brokers in the neighborhood in which
they wish to live. Real estate agents themselves stated that only 30-35% of their clients ap-
proached them as a result of seeing such signs. Id. at 89.
221. Id. at 93.
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of alternative avenues in dispersing the speaker's message and the attrac-
tiveness and practical availability of those theoretical alternatives.
This approach, however, could create its own difficulties. First,
Linmark implicitly questioned the speaker's right to choose the mode or
manner of expression that he felt would be most effective in reaching his
desired audience. While ostensibly recognizing the speaker's right to
choose, the Court decided on its own initiative that the form of commu-
nication in question, the use of the lawn signs, was in fact the most effec-
tive mode of expression. Moreover, even assuming that the Court should
have the prerogative to judge which of the speaker's alternatives are ef-
fective, any attempt to do so will certainly raise the same problems that
the Court faces when trying to hypothesize less restrictive alternatives to
the state's choice of means.222 Invariably, the Court will be required to
balance such considerations as the identity of the speaker, the intended
audience, the content of the message, and even the speaker's financial
options.
Moreover, the mere existence of the alternative access factor seems
to shift the balance against the speaker. Once sufficient alternative access
is found, the threat to speech is markedly lessened and thus easily out-
weighed. State interests far less significant than public or traffic safety
can keep the speaker off the street or out of the park. Furthermore, this
factor shifts a court's emphasis away from, or allows it to ignore, the
alternative means that the state could have used to serve its interests.
Instead, the court focuses on the possible alternative means by which the
speaker could have dispersed his message. It is as if a speaker must prove
that he cannot otherwise reach his audience before a court realistically
will require the state to justify its speech restrictions.
223
Alternative Access: To What Time, Place, or Manner?
The Court never has defined clearly the alternative access test. It
may mean no more than that the speaker must have some viable alterna-
tive for communicating his message to his audience, 224 regardless of
222. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 358-60 (1951) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (state regulation held to violate the commerce clause in light of availability of rea-
sonable and adequate alternatives).
223. Cf Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 80 (1981) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (burden on municipality to overcome presumption of invalidity by showing that its ordi-
nances were narrowly drawn and furthered "a sufficiently substantial government interest").
224. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 n.28 (1978). Because Pacifica
did not involve a public forum, but rather the electronic media, which the Court treats sui
generis, the Court found the availability of dissemination in totally different forums (tapes,
records, live concerts) to be sufficient alternative access. Id.
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whether that option is public or private. Such a definition would strip
traditional public forums of much of their value.
The test may require that the speaker have alternative access to his
chosen public forum at some time or place. Both Young225 and Schad
226
seemed to say this much. In Young, the Court emphasized that the films
in question would still be available in many theaters within the city of
Detroit.227 In Schad, the Court emphasized that one should not have to
leave the borough in order to exercise the right to view live nude
dancing.2
28
Finally, the strongest reading of the phrase would require that, at
least in a public forum, the speaker should have the right to exercise his
speech somewhere, at some time, in the mode or manner he has cho-
sen.229 Both Young and Schad could be said to have gone this far. In
both cases, the restrictions affected the locations at which the speakers
were allowed to act. In Young, however, the ordinance had nothing to
do with the manner in which the speakers chose to disseminate their
message; other theatres could still show the very same films. 230 In Schad,
the Court protected the right of businesses to display "live nude dancing"
as opposed to depictions or films.
231
Vincent 232 is somewhat unique because it was not the time, or even
the place, that was foreclosed to the speaker. The Court emphasized that
the streets, as opposed to the public utility poles, were still open to Vin-
cent whenever he wished to use them.233 It was Vincent's manner of
expressing himself in those streets that was foreclosed. Arguably, the
devaluation of first amendment rights may be far heavier in such a case.
Any time, place, or manner restriction may diminish the effective-
ness of a speaker's message, and will certainly result in preempting the
speaker's choice of when and where he thinks it best to convey his ideas
225. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
226. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
227. Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35 (plurality opinion).
228. Schad, 452 U.S. at 76-77. In contrast, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490 (1982) (plurality opinion) the Court implied that San Diego could ban billboards
everywhere within the city. Id. at 507-12.
229. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 655 (1981) (speaker had right to conduct any desired activity at some point within the
forum). In Heffron, the Court emphasized that fairgrounds did not rise to the level of a tradi-
tional forum in comparison to the public streets. Id. at 650-51. Yet, the decision allowed the
petitioner to exercise his freedom of expression in every manner that he desired at some loca-
tion within that forum. Id. at 655.
230. Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.5 (plurality opinion).
231. Schad, 452 U.S. at 75 n.17.
232. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
233. Id. at 2133-34.
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to the waiting world. 234 However, a manner restriction will often affect
the message itself. This is clearest when a manner regulation is aimed at
the very words that the speaker uses. 235 But a regulation suggesting that
a speaker use handbills rather than posters, or parades rather than hand-
bills, will force the speaker to alter the form of the message merely to
gain access to the forum.236 These alterations certainly could have an
influence on the effectiveness of the message being conveyed.
237
This does not mean that the state should not be able to regulate the
manner of communication. Certainly, a city should have the right to
regulate street parades or other large gatherings. Yet regulations gov-
erning parades and gatherings are generally restrictions on the time or
place of these events, not absolute bans. Furthermore, while the Court
never has held explicitly that a city necessarily must allow parades on its
public streets at all, its opinions suggest that a state's reasons for banning
parades must be fairly compelling. 238 It does not seem plausible that the
Court would be persuaded to affirm a total ban on parades merely be-
cause the city showed that the particular forum was still accessible to the
potential demonstrators if, for example, they demonstrated individually
at different times or places. A total ban would not be acceptable on the
ground that it would eliminate the inconvenience of providing increased
police supervision and traffic control. Such a manner regulation, even
though content-neutral, would seriously diminish not only the effective-
234. A time, place, and manner restriction also infringes on the "self-fulfillment" value of
the first amendment, that is, the right of an individual to gain the sense of satisfaction, identity,
recognition, or individual worth and dignity that are consequences of his ability to express
himself fully. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974); see also Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 1.03 (1984).
235. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). There the Court, in uphold-
ing a regulation aimed at the prohibition of the broadcasting of indecent language, distin-
guished between the ideas presented by the broadcast and the words used to express these
ideas. Arguably, the two are inseparable. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971)
("[M]uch linguistic expression conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise detached
explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well.").
236. In Young, Justice Powell stated: "The primary concern of the free speech guarantee
is that there be full opportunity for expression in all of its varied forms to convey a desired
message." 427 U.S. at 76 (Powell, J., concurring).
237. Compare id. at 78 n.2 (noting that, with respect to adult oriented films, the expression
was not of a kind where the "content or effectiveness of the message depend[ed] in some mea-
sure upon in which or how it [was] conveyed") with Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966)
(plurality opinion) (demonstrating against a segregated library in the library itself).
238. For cases in which the Court found the state's reasons for prohibiting communicative
activity to be insufficiently compelling, see Saia v. New York City, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 689-89 & n.2 (1978).
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ness of the demonstrators' message, but its very content-the message
that "we are many."
Yet Vincent must be read as holding that, should he threaten aes-
thetic values, a speaker has no right to communicate in the manner he
has chosen anywhere in his desired public forum or presumably in any
other traditional forum.239 He may use his desired forum only if he
changes his manner of expression. Alternatively, he may express himself
in his chosen manner only if he is able to find an affordable private forum
willing to accommodate him. The Court validated this fairly radical re-
striction with little effort to evaluate the practical availability or ultimate
effectiveness of the two choices it left open to Vincent.
Alternative Use Within the Public Forum
Given the content of Vincent's political posters, it seems clear that
his immediate goal was name recognition. The Court indicated that Vin-
cent still had a right to use his desired forum, the public streets, for
parades, for his individual supporters to carry posters, or for the distribu-
tion of handbills.24° The most common and least expensive option,
handbilling, would not achieve Vincent's goal adequately. While hand-
bills may aid in the presentation of the candidates' positions, they are an
inefficient way to achieve name recognition, especially in a heavily auto-
mobile-oriented community such as Los Angeles. Commuters often
enter and exit their cars on private property to which the handbiller has
no access. 241
All three options suffer from an additional defect. In a city the size
of Los Angeles, even a single councilmember's district covers many
square miles. For Vincent merely to inform the public of his candidacy
by means of the public streets would require a massive paid or volunteer
staff to distribute literature and signs at each location where the candi-
date wished to publicize his name. An unknown or minority party candi-
date is unlikely to have either. It is as if the Court, while recognizing a
239. It is fair to presume that if Vincent's posters offended the aesthetics of the city's
public streets, they surely would offend the pristine nature of its parks. See Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
453 U.S. 490, 534 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussion of speech restrictions in na-
tional parks).
240. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2123, 2133-34 (1984); id. at
2137 (Brennan, J., dissenting). An individual would be required to remain with the handbills
or posters in order to avoid prosecution for littering as allowed by Schneider.
241. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). But see Prune Yard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (States may grant constitutional access to private shopping centers
under provisions of state constitutions without violating property rights of owners.).
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speaker's right of access to the public forum, has destroyed its real use-
fulness. Each of the suggested alternatives converts an economically via-
ble forum for those without financial resources 242 into the domain of the
well-to-do who, in light of the forum's inefficiency, would seldom use it
anyway. In granting Vincent the empty promise of continued access to
the streets, the Court failed to consider the reality that its proposed alter-
natives would diminish substantially, if not entirely eliminate, the effec-
tiveness of Vincent's message.
Apparently, the present Court does not view streets and parks as
currently meaningful forums, but considers private modes of expression,
particularly the media, to be the truly effective forums in the modem
political process. The Court may be correct. The fact that the media
may only be used at great expense, and in contrast to traditional forums,
has recognized power to exercise prior restraint on what it will dissemi-
nate,2 43 would seem to mandate greater, rather than lesser, protection of
the traditionally low cost open forums,244 if for no other reason than to
preserve a situs for voices otherwise lost in the wilderness. Vincent,
however, indicates otherwise.
Alternative Nontraditional Forums
Assuming that the Court intended to include in its judicial balance a
speaker's access to nontraditional forums, this access is likely to be either
ineffective, inefficient, or unavailable to a candidate without financial
support or with a minority or unpopular viewpoint. Suggested private
alternatives include the posting of signs or handbills on automobiles or
on private property with the permission of the owners,245 renting bill-
boards2 46 or private property on which to post signs, or using the mass
242. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (door-to-door distribu-
tion of circulars necessary to further causes of those poorly financed); see also Kalven, The
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 30; cf. Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102-04 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting) (importance of access to those who
lack the money to own or control publishing plants, newspapers, and electronic media).
243. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (print media have
total discretion over their content, subject only to libel laws); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (no right of access to the broadcast media for
editorial or political advertisements).
244. In a sense, the Court's recent invalidation of restraints on sizable private political
expenditures further reduces the opportunities of the less affluent to exert meaningful political
influence. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (campaign expenditure
limits on candidates' own funds or those from third parties held unconstitutional).
245. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2123 (1984); id. at 2137
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
246. This presumes that the city could not totally prohibit political billboards. But the
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media.
The use of private property for posting, however, requires the
owner's permission, either gratuitously offered, which is unlikely if the
speaker advocates generally unpopular views,247 or purchased at each
site where the speaker desires to express his message. Seeking permissive
use forces the speaker to exercise his constitutional rights by inducing
another party, in this case a private property owner, to forego his own
right of privacy or at least his right to keep his own freedom of associa-
tion undisclosed. The owner's rights gain special importance when he is
asked to endorse a minority position, 248 for that is when he may be most
reluctant to reveal that he is associated with a relatively unpopular view-
point. Attempting to purchase access through the leasing of billboards,
assuming that billboards continue to be lawfully available, would be pro-
hibitively expensive to the minority party candidate, often wasteful given
the little space needed to convey a message as brief as the candidate's
name and desired office, and not necessarily feasible at all if the owner of
the board is at all opposed to the candidate's position.249 In this sense,
the Vincent case has not only elevated property rights over first amend-
ment rights, it has made property ownership a virtual prerequisite to the
effective exercise of first amendment rights.
250
Use of the mass media, especially the electronic media, is also excep-
tionally expensive and not necessarily available. The print media have no
obligation to carry Vincent's message even if he pays them to do so, and
irrespective of the fact that they may cover, without charge, the views of
validity of such a prohibition, at least so long as it were applied on a content-neutral basis, still
seems an open question. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 515 n.20
(1981) (plurality opinion).
247. For example, an advocate of higher property taxes is unlikely to find such willing
private property owners. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2137
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
248. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
249. Private parties are not subject to the first amendment. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991 (1982) (action of nursing homes receiving public funds not sufficient "state action" to
invoke constitutional due process limitations); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 200 (1979) (because private employer's affirmative action plan does not involve "state
action," no fourteenth amendment issue presented); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345 (1974) (private utility company not subject to fourteenth amendment because no
"state action" found). But see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (congressional
power can limit private conspiracy to deprive others of enjoyment of their civil rights if motive
behind conspiracy is racially or otherwise discriminatory); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) (private company-owned town held to have violated first amendment rights).
250. See Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence of Property Rights as the Foremost Principle of
Civil Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 66, 72-76
(1980).
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opposing candidates.251 Moreover, in the case of print media, the audi-
ence that the speaker intends to reach must affirmatively seek the
speaker's message. Alternatively, the candidate has no legal right to be
covered by, or even to purchase time, on the electronic media,252
although under certain circumstances, political editorials or personal at-
tacks will trigger a broadcaster's statutory obligation to afford the candi-
date reply time.2 53 Even a candidate espousing somewhat popular views
is unlikely to gain effective backing, financial or numerical, until he has
had an effective opportunity to gain name recognition. Then once more
he is relegated to taking his message to the streets and parks.
The Court, however, addressed none of these potential problems in
Vincent. In essence, the state's purported interest in Vincent was tenuous
at best, the negative effect of Vincent's mode of expression upon that
interest was arguably marginal, and the means used by the state to fur-
ther its interest were the most speech-suppressive possible because of the
many areas of the city, only the public streets were closed to temporary
political expression. Given these facts, the Court should have seriously
considered the alternative access element. Yet the Court seemed to avoid
even defining alternative access, 254 much less meaningfully applying a
definition to the case before it. Rather, the Court seemed to assume that
the first amendment threat in Vincent was relatively trivial. Regardless
of whether it was for lack of concern for the free speech values involved
or for lack of legal standards by which to evaluate the city's asserted
interests or methodology, the Court did not balance the harm to aesthetic
interests against the harm to free speech. The Court instead deferred to
the city's contention that the harm to the city was substantial, and then
itself found that the harm to the speaker was not.255
251. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (Florida statute
requiring newspapers to give equal coverage violates first amendment).
252. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)
(neither the constitution nor any statute requires equal coverage of political viewpoints).
253. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (fairness doctrine regu-
lations held not to violate the first amendment). But see FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104
S. Ct. 3106 (1984):
We note that the FCC, observing that "[i]f any substantial possibility exists that
the [fairness doctrine] rules have impeded, rather than furthered, First Amendment
objectives, repeal may be warranted on that ground alone," has tentatively concluded
that the rules, by effectively chilling speech, do not serve the public interest, and has
therefore proposed to repeal them.
Id. at 3117 n.12.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 232-33.
255. In contrast, the Court's application of its public forum standards in United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983), was very different. In Grace, plaintiffs brought a facial challenge
against a federal statute that in part prohibited the "display [of] any flag, banner, or device
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Possible Resolutions
There are numerous analytical approaches that the Supreme Court
might adopt to resolve the conflict between a community's desire to en-
hance its visual environment and a speaker's desire to give his message
the fullest dissemination. Such approaches could be much more speech
protective than the Court's current analytical framework. Possibilities
range from the Court's application of a truly searching degree of judicial
scrutiny to regulations affecting free speech to a fuller recognition of a
speech hierarchy under which different categories of expression would be
given varying degrees of judicial protection. Each of these possibilities
has its own advantages and disadvantages.
The Reassertion of Heightened Judicial Scrutiny
The most legally consistent and unremarkable solution to the diffi-
culties posed by the Court's recent public forum decisions would be for
the Court to apply its espoused heightened degree of scrutiny to time,
place, and manner restrictions in a far more searching and realistic man-
ner. The Court should truly attempt to assess the substantiality, rather
than the mere legitimacy, of the state's asserted interest, and it should be
willing to relate more closely the means used by the state to the overall
problem it is attempting to alleviate.
Yet this solution may impose a difficult burden on the Court. In
Vincent,256 and even in Metromedia,257 it could be argued that the Court
allowed an undefinable, rather than an insubstantial, interest to override
designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement" in the
United States Supreme Court building or on its grounds. Id. at 172-73. The Court considered
the statute's validity only as applied to the plaintiffs-one of whom had passed out leaflets, the
other of whom had displayed a sign-on sidewalks adjacent to the building. Although oral
expression was not prohibited by the statute, the Court, interpreting the statute as a total ban
on leafletting and picketting in a traditional public forum, held the statute invalid. Id. at 176-
78. The Court found justifiable the interests that the statute purported to serve, including the
protection of the building, persons, and property and the obstruction of access. Id. at 182-83.
Historically, those are the very types of interests that time, place, and manner regulations are
intended to protect. The Court, however, found that the extension of the statute to the side-
walks was not necessary to serve those interests, because the adjacent sidewalks were no differ-
ent than any other sidewalks in the city. Id. at 179. Furthermore, perhaps relying on its own
experience, the Court ruled that the statute was not necessary to preserve the appearance that
the Supreme Court is free from improper outside influence. Id. at 182-83. Certainly, a lone
picketer or leafleteer would create no such appearance. Id. at 183. The Court did not weigh
the fact that the plaintiffs could have used other forms of communication at that very same
location, or alternatively, that they could have used a wide variety of forms of expression on
literally any other sidewalk in the city. Id. at 181 & n.10.
256. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
257. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion).
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free speech values. While Vincent, Metromedia, and Young 2 58 evidenced
the application of an extremely lenient test of regulatory means, they
may better represent a judicial inability to apply meaningful means scru-
tiny when the state's purpose is hard to grasp. 25 9 Nonetheless, Schad
demonstrates that a truly heightened degree of scrutiny, particularly
when evaluating those regulatory means, would certainly better protect
free speech interests.
The Relevance of the Speaker's Alternative Access
Assuming that the revitalization of a heightened degree of scrutiny
is a viable solution to the public forum problem, the approach should
require the Court to reinforce the "alternative access" element of its cur-
rent standards. Initially, the Court carefully should prevent the alterna-
tive access element from indirectly determining the degree of scrutiny it
applies to the regulation in question. Presently, if the Court fails to find a
significant burden on expressive activities, it will give extreme deference
to the policy of the rule-making body. This approach seemed to distin-
guish Young, in which the city dispersed the particular activities
throughout the forum but did not affect its form or quantity,260 from
Schad, in which the borough would not allow the particular activities in
the forum at all.2 61 Nevertheless, if this is to be the Court's approach,
the Court must more thoughtfully analyze the alternative access ques-
tion, for it is making this element the touchstone of the whole balancing
process.
In a case like Vincent, in which content-neutrality does not seem to
be an issue and the means-end test, because of the immeasurability of the
interest at stake, is difficult to apply meaningfully, the Court should be
ready to endorse a restraint on expressive activities only when the
speaker's alternatives are measurable, and actually are measured, in rela-
tively objective and practical terms. The Court seemed to take this ap-
proach in the Linmark262 case.
Yet, acknowledging the Court's endless difficulties in applying stan-
dards that attempt to evaluate alternatives, whether they relate to the
means chosen by the state or the means chosen by the speaker, a better
approach might be to reject the alternative access element altogether.
258. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
259. See supra notes 158-67 & accompanying text.
260. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1976).
261. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
262. Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). In Vincent, in
contrast, the Court's suggested alternatives were evaluated neither in terms of their overall
effectiveness, nor in terms of their availability to the speaker in question.
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This would buttress the speaker's power to choose the means of self-ex-
pression he believes is best for him, so long as a court finds that the
state's action has placed a more than minimal restraint on the time,
place, or manner of his fully protected speech in a traditional public
forum.
2 6 3
This approach need not allow the speaker total freedom to choose
the time, place, and manner of his expression.264 It would, however,
force the state to justify its interests and regulatory means independently
of its, or the Court's, own appraisal of the effectiveness of the speaker's
choice of forum and his particular manner of expression. If the alterna-
tive access standard were eliminated, the Court would lose its present
ability to avoid applying a meaningful analysis to the other elements of
the public forum standards by effectively rendering them irrelevant. The
Court could no longer find that although the speaker may be injured, he
is not sufficiently injured in the Court's eyes. In fact, elimination of the
alternative access standard would simply return the Court to an earlier
version of first amendment restraints on public forum restrictions.
265
Increased Recognition of a Speech Hierarchy
In view of the Court's willingness to recognize new problems posed
by societal development-problems either produced by progress or al-
ready extant but ignored in earlier years because of different societal pri-
orities266-it is worth considering a variety of doctrinally suggested, but
judicially untested, solutions to the problems posed by Vincent.267 Some
of these changes may require a marked shift in the Court's approach to
263. For 30 years, the availability of alternative speaker access was not a consideration in
determining whether a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation was justifiable. See
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (plurality opinion); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
264. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (trespass statute constitutionally applied
against demonstrators exercising first amendment rights on grounds surrounding public jail-
house); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (regulations prohibiting use of mobile sound
trucks permissible).
265. Early public forum decisions viewed only the substantiality of the state's interest and
the regulatory means adopted to further that interest. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569, 575-78 (1941). Once a speaker was found to be affected by the regulation, the fact that he
might have other means by which to disperse his message was not relevant to the Court.
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
266. For example, aesthetic concerns always may have existed, and they have been recog-
nized for years in other areas of constitutional law. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33
(1954); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-90 (1926). But in public
forum cases involving questions of orderly traffic control or adequate police supervision for
speakers or their audience, aesthetic issues may have been viewed by the Court as relatively
unimportant.
267. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
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free speech issues in the public forum area, yet most of these changes
have judicial or scholarly support.
For example, the Court could reassert its position that commercial
speech does, in fact, receive less first amendment protection than polit-
ical, social, or informational speech. 268 Admittedly, this approach would
further legitimize the Court's potentially troublesome present tendency
to assign variable values to different types of speech. 269 There are, how-
ever, numerous justifications for treating commercial speech differently.
First, in light of history, commercial speech does seem to fulfill a
less important role in furthering first amendment values than does polit-
ical speech. As defined by the Court, the role of commercial speech in
communicating ideas or furthering ultimate social progress is limited. 270
Second, the Court's fears that the government will attempt to further its
own points of view through time, place, and manner regulation do not
seem applicable to commercial speech.271 Third, it is unlikely that a pur-
veyor of commercial speech will encounter wholly hostile private forums
should he seek alternative means of disseminating his message.
Although there are smaller commercial enterprises that frequently rely
on posted flyers, the commercial advertiser generally expects to buy his
alternative access rather than to use public forums. If the price is right,
those forums will be available.
The devaluation of commercial speech would have practical and
legal advantages. Commercial advertising constitutes a major source of
268. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 505-07 (1981) (plurality
opinion); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1979) (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976)).
269. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 761-62 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); id.
at 762-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 84-88
(1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticisms of the majority's valuation of the speech at issue).
270. Commercial speech is defined as speech that does " 'no more than propose a commer-
cial transaction.' " Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). But it arguably deserves protection because of the" 'information of
potential interest and value' conveyed, rather than because of any direct contribution to the
interchange of ideas." Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 780 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975)). Arguably, such speech also adds little to en-
lightened public decision-making in a democracy, at least with respect to political, social, and
other public issues. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 787-88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 597-98 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
271. It would seem that those welding governmental power would have no self-interest
threatened by truly commercial messages. It is unlikely that, as an institutional body, they
often would have a point of view to promote in the commercial marketplace.
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temporary visual blight,272 particularly during periods when there are no
political campaigns. The fact that Los Angeles is willing to allow the
public to hang certain noncommercial banners from the city's utility
cross-bars for short periods of time supports this view.273 Moreover, the
Court frequently has recognized that commercial speech and political
speech do not hold equal sway in the public forum. Consequently, it is
possible for the Court to allow a municipality to regulate commercial
speech for reasons and in a manner that would not meet judicial stan-
dards if the speech were considered fully protected.274 The Court could
hold that interests as tenuous as visual attractiveness are sufficient to
meet a lower level of scrutiny justifying attempts to channel or to ban
commercial speech. Locational differences could be based explicitly on
content, a position implicitly endorsed in Metromedia.275 In fact, a dif-
ferent level of scrutiny for commercial speech might tend to limit, or
even reverse, the Court's present tendency to treat content-neutrality as
the only real talisman of whether or not a time, place, and manner re-
striction is lawful. 276 Still, while the Court has developed an objective
test to determine what constitutes commercial speech,277 it has not
avoided entirely the classification problems suggested by Justice Brennan
in Metromedia.
278
An alternative approach, with some scholarly approbation but little
judicial support, would elevate political speech to a unique level of first
272. In the Vincent case, in a weekly survey of confiscated temporary signs, most of the
confiscated temporary signs were commercial. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2122.
273. During the 1984 Olympic Games, the city of Los Angeles attached temporary ban-
ners to the very same utility poles where Vincent's posters were banned. See Los ANGELES,
CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE art. VII, ch. 6, § 67.00 (1976) (providing for the erection of signs
commemorating historical, cultural, or artistic events).
274. The Los Angeles ordinances recognize this distinction by prohibiting the dissemina-
tion of commercial leaflets, a regulation that could not be applied to political speech. Id. art.
VIII, ch. 2, § 28.01-.01.1; see also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (regulations prohibit-
ing political leafletting held constitutionally invalid).
275. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 503-12 (1981) (plurality opin-
ion) (content-oriented locational restrictions valid as applied to commercial speech).
276. See Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Misplaced Trust in the
Judgment of Public Officials, 32 BUFFALO L. REv. 175 (1983).
277. Commercial speech is that which proposes a commercial transaction. Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 760-62 (1976); see also Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (commercial
speech defined as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience").
278. 453 U.S. at 538-39 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's dilemma arises from
the fact that messages promoting a given commercial product may often have informational or
even political overtones. See also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 579-83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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amendment protection. 279 If the Court granted political speech the posi-
tion of "most equal among equals," it could avoid the dangers inherent in
the negative valuation of broad categories of speech. This approach
would both allow and force the Court to maintain its present level of
scrutiny for time, place, and manner forum regulations, but would im-
pose a higher standard of judicial review for restrictions on political
speech. The Court has previously used a two-tiered analysis to judge the
validity of governmental action. 280 Moreover, this distinction would still
allow the government to pursue legitimate goals. For example, judicial
scrutiny that invalidates a billboard regulation as it applies to political
messages, but upholds the regulation as it applies to commercial bill-
boards, would still allow the city to eliminate the great majority of its
visual clutter.
This approach, however, also creates difficulties in valuing and clas-
sifying speech. Such a position assumes that political speech deserves
greater protection than other first amendment speech. Apart from pro-
tecting political discourse, the first amendment promotes the goals of in-
dividual self-realization by protecting the speaker's right to express a
position on any aspect of life and the listener's right to increase his own
opportunities for fuller self-development by having the opportunity to
hear a variety of positions on all areas of life.28 1 Whether or not these
values have political consequences, heightened protection for political
speech necessarily appears to relegate these other values to a lesser posi-
tion within the first amendment framework. In order to embrace this
approach, one must accept the presumption that speech that relates to
the very basis of our democratic institutions may deserve the most consti-
tutional protection.
Moreover, definitional problems remain, although they may not be
totally intractable. Speech that seems concerned mainly with informa-
tional, religious, or even commercial issues may have political over-
279. See supra note 13 & accompanying text.
280. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (suspect classifica-
tions must be justified by a compelling state interest) with Dandridge v. Williams, 391 U.S.
471, 484-87 (1970) (nonsuspect classifications are justified if the state has a rational basis for its
actions); compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (protected speech advocat-
ing the use of force may only be prohibited "where such advocacy is likely to incite lawless
actions") with Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1973) (the states "may chart
their own course" in regulating obscene speech). See generally Kalven, The Metaphysics of the
Law of Obscenity, 2 PUB. ENT. ADVERT. & ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 439 (1963).
281. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also T. EMERSON, THE SYS-
TEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970).
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tones. 282 Such speech may also influence the listener's political opinions
even if the speaker does not intend to convey any political message. Un-
like the case of commercial speech, any objective standard protecting all
political speech would be so overbroad that it would undermine the
state's power to regulate any noncommercial speech within the public
forum.
283
If, however, the Court were to sacrifice political speech that only has
incidental political overtones, the problem might become more managea-
ble. For example, the Court might insulate only expression specifically
referring to candidates or issues-referenda, initiatives, or amend-
ments-clearly being contested during an upcoming election from other-
wise content-neutral public forum regulations.
Certainly, the application of these definitional standards will raise
factual issues in certain cases. Definitional problems, however, are also
raised by the Court's attempts to determine what constitutes less pro-
tected expression, such as commercial speech or offensive language, or to
determine what is not first -amendment speech at all.284 Deciding
whether a given poster relates to an upcoming election, however, seems
to present a more objective task than trying to determine which words or
phrases are patently offensive to community standards or which films
appeal to a viewer's prurient interests.
Moreover, the Court could, in cases such as Vincent, allow certain
regulations on political speech under its current time, place, and manner
standards that would permit the state to substantially preserve its inter-
ests. The Court could, for example, allow posters only for specified time
periods encompassing the election, require their removal shortly thereaf-
ter, and place the burden or cost of removal on the speaker. Those re-
quirements, while protecting the political speaker, as a practical matter
282. Interestingly, the case that initially signalled the Court's willingness to afford com-
mercial speech some degree of first amendment protection involved an advertisement for an
abortion clinic that had clear political ramifications. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
283. A commercial advertisement promoting the use of contraceptives as a form of birth
control superior to abortion might include political, informational, religious, and financial
arguments.
284. Certainly, the issue would seem easier to resolve than the Court's frustrating attempts
to define obscenity, and the consequences of judicial error would be far less catastrophic.
Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) ("Obscene material is material which
deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.") with Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (three part test for obscenity that included whether "the material is
utterly without redeeming social value") and Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973)
(three part test for obscenity that included "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"). See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 79-93 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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could discourage the use of posters by others because of the limited eco-
nomic efficiency of erecting posters for a limited duration.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Vincent,285 that a city can constitu-
tionally prohibit the posting of political signs on city property because of
a visual aesthetic interest, is disheartening. It tarnishes the Court's re-
cent attempts to broaden free speech protection by including new forms
of expression within the protection of the first amendment. The decision
also suggests that the Court's recent decisions, rather than limiting the
reasons justifying state regulation of speech, may instead have extended
aesthetic justifications to areas in which such state regulation previously
was not allowed. In the Court's attempt to treat a wider variety of
speech more equally, the Court has elevated previously unprotected ex-
pression, while simultaneously degrading fully protected speech and the
concept of the public forum.
At least in cases in which state regulation is ostensibly content-neu-
tral, the Court has lowered substantially its level of judicial scrutiny of
time, place, and manner regulations. The Court presently gives extreme
deference to the government's asserted purposes, while maintaining that
it is using a significantly higher standard.2 86 The Court has recognized
unverifiable state interests as substantial ones. Further, the Court's at-
tempt to formulate meaningful standards with which to identify and to
evaluate such aesthetic goals has led it to approach the issue of regula-
tory means without considering the true effect of the regulation in curing
the harms the state maintains are present. In addition, this approach
neglects to consider practical realities in determining when speech inter-
ests are insignificantly threatened. Whether or not the balance of inter-
ests in Vincent ultimately should have favored the city, the Court's
analysis provides a very weak underpinning for its conclusion.
More disturbingly, the Court's analysis evidences little concern for
the ultimate effects that the approach evident in Vincent may have on
speech as fully protected as pure political speech and on public forums as
traditionally free from burdensome regulations as the public streets and
parks. If content-neutrality is the only meaningful touchstone in evaluat-
ing time, place, and manner regulations, the logical result could be the
wholesale closure of all traditional public forums.
The solution to these problems range from possibilities as unremark-
285. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
286. See supra notes 66-67, 166-67 & accompanying text.
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able as the reassertion of the heightened scrutiny the Court currently
professes to use in evaluating speech restrictive measures, to the elevation
of political speech in the hierarchy of first amendment protection. Yet
the preferred resolution may be to accept that the promotion of visual
aesthetics is a valid state goal, while conceding that the standards for
determining what constitutes an attractive living environment may be
vague, intuitive, or a matter of individual taste. In evaluating a regula-
tion whose purpose is ostensibly to promote such aesthetics, the Court
could meaningfully scrutinize the means the state has chosen to use, per-
haps applying an amalgam of both the comprehensive plan analysis and a
more stringent application of its requirement that the state's means be
narrowly tailored. The former test would evaluate the validity of the
state's overall legislative purpose, while the latter would ensure that any
particular regulation with speech-suppressive effects has its own in-
dependent jusitification. As the situation now stands, however, the Vin-
cent decision clearly violates the basic tenet that "the streets are natural
and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and
one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate
places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place." 287
287. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
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